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Part V: International Perspectives
Chapter 11: Israel
Land Use Law in the Face of a Rapid-Growth Crisis:
The Case of Mass-Immigration to Israel in the 1990s
Rachelle Alterman*
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, land use law in most countries rarely distinguishes
among planning contexts in terms of the rate of growth that is to be
managed. The same legislation presumably is expected to apply to
situations where a town, city, region, or country is relatively stable or
stagnant, and to situations where these are undergoing accelerated
growth. That was true for the traditional United States zoning-based
system, which has been criticized for not being well suited to
managing rapid growth.1 “Growth management” is ostensibly better
suited for managing growth.
Growth management in American planning lingo refers to
planning-based policies adopted by cities and towns to control the
extent, type, and most importantly, the rate and timing of
development. Most of the tools usually classified under this category
are growth limiting, not growth promoting, and include means such
as service boundaries, phases, moratoria, freezes, and infrastructure
* Rachelle Alterman is the David Azrieli Professor of Town Planning at the Faculty of
Architecture and Town Planning at the Technion— Israel Institute of Technology and chairs the
Technion’s Graduate Program in Urban and Regional Planning. Dr. Altermanm who holds a
BA Honors and an M.C.P. from Manitoba, a D.Sc. from the Technion and an LLB from Tel
Aviv University (in that order), is well known internationally for her research and numerous
publications on comparative planning and land use law, land policy, and planning theory.
1. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 653 (4th ed. 1995).
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concurrency conditions.2
In the USA, as in many other advanced-economy countries, rapid
urban or regional growth is often seen as a negative process, a recipe
for social conflict. Growth management is all too often a cover for a
policy of social exclusion.3 Such a policy is justified by some voters
and decision-makers as intended to protect the property values of
existing residents, or to restrict the entry of poorer people who might
become a burden on social services and strain the town’s financial
base (Downs, 1973; Stein, 1993; Nelson 1996; Haar, 1996;
Danielsen, Lang, and Fulton, 1999)4. Where accelerated growth is
due not to “regular” inter-city migration but rather to an influx of
mass immigration, one might expect even greater problems of social
exclusion.
The purpose of this Article is to investigate the effect of an
extremely accelerated growth rate— a crisis— on land use legislation
and decision-making structure. I report on the mass immigration to
Israel in the 1990s and its aftermath, and analyze the lessons that
scholars of land use law and planning might draw from this case.
How did political leaders, legislators, planners, and the courts
perceive the suitability of the existing land use legislation for
handling the crisis of accelerated growth? Did they feel it necessary
to introduce changes in the legislation and decision-making
institutions so as to meet the demands of accelerated growth and
prevent social exclusion? Were these changes effective in handing
the crisis and what was the price paid? And how did the courts
reflect, or react to, the crisis?
2. Id. at 653-704.
3. Id.
4. Karen A. Danielson et al., Retracting Suburbia: Smart Growth and the Future of
Housing, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 513 (1999); ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING UP THE
SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR AMERICA (1973); CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER
SEIGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996); Arthur C. Nelson, Inclusioinary
Mandates for Plans in Growth Management States (1996) (unpublished paper presented at the
1996 annual conference of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning jointly held with
the Association of European Schools of Planning in Toronto); GROWTH MANAGEMENT: THE
PLANNING CHALLENGE OF 1990S (Jay M. Stein ed., 1993). In order to mitigate such
exclusionary trends, several U.S. states have adopted a promising antidote— ”inclusionary
housing” policies. Nico Calavito et al., Inclusionary Housing in California and New Jersey: A
Comparative Analysis, 8 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 109 (1997); Alan Mallach, Inclusionary
Housing Programs: Policies and Practices (1984); Nelson, supra.
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After introducing the Israeli mass-immigration case study, I shall
introduce Israel’s “vital statistics,” the key urban and regional
policies, and the major land and housing policies. The general
constitutional and institutional setting at the national and local-
government levels is then presented to provide the context for
understanding land use legislation. Next, I shall present the pre-crisis
statutory land use planning system and the reasons for its failure
during the crisis. A major part of this Article is then devoted to the
crisis-time legislative process, to analysis of the special law enacted,
and to several High Court decisions that have provided judicial
interpretation. Due to the need to handle rapid growth, the new
legislation was used very intensively within a relatively short period
of time, and I am able to provide a concise description of its
application and impacts. Last, the readers will wish to know whether
after the crisis tapered down, there was a return to the pre-crisis
legislation or, perhaps, whether the exposure to rapid growth has
stimulated revisions in planning legislation and practice. I conclude
with some possible “take away” lessons from the case study
concerning the capacity of land use law to manage accelerated
growth.
I. BACKGROUND TO ISRAEL ON THE EVE OF THE CRISIS
In order to assess the degree of growth brought by mass
immigration, I should first establish the “base line” from which
change diverted.
A. The “Base-Line” and the Growth-Management Challenge
Despite its general exposure to crises derived from its geopolitical
and security context, on the eve of the immigration wave, Israel was in
a relatively placid period. By the 1980s Israel had successfully extracted
itself from the turbulent developing-country mode of the 1950 and
1960.5 Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person was gradually
approaching a South-European level. Since the mid-1980s the
5. Rachelle Alterman & Morris Hill, Land Use Planning in Israel, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON LAND USE PLANNING (Nicholas N. Patricios ed., 1986).
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immigration rate had been at an all-time low averaging some twelve
thousand annually, thus barely offsetting outward migration by Israelis.
This was a new situation with which the country had to come to grips
not only demographically but also ideologically. Against this backdrop,
the crisis-time rate of immigration of one hundred fifty thousand and
two hundred thousand in 1990 and 1991 respectively represented a
thirteen to fifteen-fold growth. The post-crisis rates since 1993 of fifty
to eighty thousand annually, though low compared with the crisis-time
rates, were still some four to seven times higher than in the years just
prior to the crisis.
Israel’s population is ninety-two percent urban— among the highest
urban population in the world6— while Israel’s land area is
approximately 20,500 square kilometics (8000 square miles), not much
larger than New Jersey. In 1999 the population density was seven
hundred fifty persons per square mile (293 per square km), among the
highest in the world.7
The 1980s in Israel were a period of inward focus: urban-
revitalization projects rather than massive new developments;
accelerated social integration among ethnic groups; and steps toward
greater economic and political equality between Israel’s Jewish majority
and its Arab minority. There were also initial steps toward government
decentralization in a previously highly-centralized and government-
heavy country,8 growing public participation and interest-group
influence,9 and initial steps to privatize government-owned corporations
and outsource public services. That decade also witnessed the gradual
dismantling of some of the country’s most venerated symbols. Among
these were the world-renowned cooperative rural communities
(kibbutzim and moshavim), which had begun a process of economic and
6. Seventy-four percent of the population in the United States is urban, seventy-seven percent
in Canada, eighty-nine percent in Britain, eighty-four percent in Sweden, and eighty-nine percent in
the Netherlands. UNITED NATIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK (1996).
7. Since over fifty percent of Israel’s land area is in the inhospitable southern desert, the
effective density is much higher.
8. Rachelle Alterman, Implementing Decentralization for Neighborhood Regeneration:
Factors Promoting or Inhibiting Success, 54 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 454 (1988); Gabriel
Shefer, Society, Politics, Government and National Level Planning in Israel, in TOWARDS THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE “ISRAEL 2020” PLAN: NATIONAL-LEVEL PLANNING INSTITUTIONS
AND DECISIONS IN TEN COUNTRIES (Rachelle Alterman ed., 1996).
9. YAEL YISHAI, LAND OF PARADOXES: INTEREST POLITICS IN ISRAEL (1991).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/29
p773+Alterman.doc 01/04/01
2000] Land Use Law in the Face of a Rapid-Growth Challenge 777
social restructuring.
As international conditions changed, the doors of the USSR were
opened for emigration to Israel of Soviet Jews and their non-Jewish
family members. The first trickle started in November 1989,
becoming an avalanche in 1990-1992. By 1993, when the crisis
subsided, five hundred thousand immigrants had been added to
Israel’s 1989 population of four and a half million, and by the year
2000, one million had arrived, and the total population was six
million (including over one million Israeli Arab citizens). Projections
in 1990 oscillated widely. Hindsight shows that at first these
projections were gross underestimates, and then they swung to the
other extreme, expecting one to two million within three years.
Uncertainty was the name of the game. The impacts on almost every
aspect of society and the economy were expected to be considerable.
A special challenge was faced by land use, urban and regional
planners. They were expected to prevent a housing shortage by
enabling the construction of hundreds of thousands of additional
dwelling units, alongside the physical infrastructure and public
services made necessary by the sudden influx of immigrants.
B. Israel as a Case-Study
Israel is an especially appropriate country for studying the effect
of a rapid-growth crisis on planning legislation because its “normal”
planning system may seem to land use law scholars as the ideal
growth-management system. Americans would recognize the
elements of the Israeli statutory planning system as a combination
among the statewide zoning powers of Hawaii,10 the hierarchical
oversight of Florida and some other states,11 alongside the tough
farmland preservation controls of Oregon.12 Compared not only to the
United States but also to most other Western countries, Israeli
10. DAVID L. CALLIES, PRESERVING PARADISE: WHY REGULATIONS WON’T WORK
(1994); DAVID L. CALLIES, REGULATING PARADISE: LAND USE CONTROLS IN HAWAII (1984).
11. John M. DeGrove & Patricia M. Metzger, Growth Management and the Integrated
Roles of State, Regional, and Local Governments, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT: THE PLANNING
CHALLENGE OF THE 1990S (Jay M. Stein ed., 1993).
12. Deborah A. Howe, Growth Management in Oregon, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT: THE
PLANNING CHALLENGE OF THE 1990S (Jay M. Stein ed., 1993).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p773+Alterman.doc 01/04/01
778 Festschrift [Vol. 3:773
planning legislation ostensibly contains almost every conceivable
growth-management tool. There is considerable national-level
oversight and ample powers of control and implementation.
Israel’s national goals have ideologically always been pro-growth
and pro-immigration.13 This is one country that one would expect to
have national-level planning powers that can ensure, when necessary,
an efficient process of approval of plans and permits to accommodate
growth. One would expect that under such a system, national interests
would be able to override local interests without much difficulty. For
example, if there is local resistance to the absorption of a large
number of immigrant households or to public-program housing, one
would expect the regular planning system to have the powers to
overcome such resistance. Yet, as this Article will show, Israel’s
centralized planning system, despite its considerable planning-control
powers and intergovernmental coordinating tools, turned out to be
unsuited to accommodating rapid growth. It had to be drastically
restructured in order to be able to accommodate the crisis.
The absorption of a large number of immigrants in Israel in the
1990s presents one of the more distinct large-scale “laboratories” for
studying the challenge of handling accelerated growth in a
democratic polity and developed economy— a crisis that is not a
product of war or of a natural disaster. It is an especially convenient
case study because it enables one to observe the decision-makers’ and
legislators’ responses before, during, and after the crisis—
vantagepoints that other major national crises rarely offer. The
relatively short and well-bounded period of time when the crisis was
at its peak enabled me to examine how it unfolded in real-time, as
well as some of its outputs and likely outcomes as they appeared by
2001.14
13. The Law of the Return grants all Jews or non-Jewish family members to the third
generation, the right to immigrate to Israel and to automatic citizenship, regardless of
socioeconomic, health, or education status.
14. For the full story of the crisis and how planners handled it, see RACHELLE ALTERMAN,
PLANNING IN THE FACE OF CRISIS: HOUSING AND URBAN POLICYMAKING IN RESPONSE TO
MASS IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL IN THE 1990S (forthcoming 2001).
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C. A Brief Introduction to National Land and Housing Policies
Israel presents an interesting, probably unique, mix of public and
private-sector action in land development and housing.15 An
estimated ninety-three percent of Israel’s total land area is publicly
owned. However, private land has always played a much more
significant role than its numeric size implies. With municipal land
banking almost unheard of in Israel, reflecting the legal and financial
weakness of local authorities, almost all the public land is owned by
state or quasi-state authorities and is administered by the Israel Lands
Administration— a statutory agency established in 1960. The
Administration, in releasing land for development, must usually use
leasehold tenure. The 1960 Basic Law: Israel Lands and its
complementary 1960 Israel Lands Law strictly limit the legal
authority to transfer public land to private freehold tenure. The
substitute is short or, usually, longterm leaseholds and these govern
about two-thirds of the housing and a high proportion of businesses
and industry in Israel. But, due to several decades of what I call
“crawling-privatization,”16 however, the longterm leasehold contracts
in urban areas place virtually no restrictions on open-market
transactions.17
Most agricultural land, too, is publicly owned and under leases
that place strict use limits. Unlike the urban sector, privatization
trends in the rural sector were minimal before the crisis. On the eve
of the mass immigration, most land reserves in Israel were classified
as agricultural, so it will not be surprising that the land use and
contractual status of such land became a major issue during the crisis.
Privatization trends also typified the housing sector on the eve of
the crisis. During the state’s first twenty or twenty-five years, until
the mid-1970s, the majority of housing starts was either built directly
by the state or was state-supported. This second type of housing—
what Europeans call “social housing”— Israelis call “public-program
15. Barrie Needham & Roelof Verhage, Housing and Land Israel and the Netherlands, 69
TOWN PLANNING REV. 397 (1998).
16. RACHELLE ALTERMAN, ISRAEL’S FUTURE LAND POLICY (1999) (Hebrew).
17. For a full exposition of Israel’s land policy and the quasi-privatization trends it has
been undergoing, see ALTERMAN, supra note 16. An English-language concise description is
available in Alterman, supra note 14.
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housing.” Most of these housing units are condominiums built on
public land with private capital and risk. The residents own a
longterm leasehold drawn out by the Lands Administration. The
share of public-program housing nose-dived, so that by the latter
1980s it was only seventeen percent. State-built housing was totally
phased out. Any resumption of state intervention in housing
construction to meet the mass immigration would constitute a major
change of course.
Israeli cities and towns are relatively compact, and resemble cities
and towns in Europe. Most Israelis live in medium-density
condominiums (by American standards most would be regarded as
high-density). Until the 1980s, land-consuming single or double-family
low-rise houses were reserved for ex-urban communities only.
However, since the mid-1980s, consumer demand for such housing on
the up-market side led many towns and cities to promote more low-rise
housing (but at a higher density than its U.S. parallels).18 The 1980s also
saw Israel’s first sprawling shopping malls on the outskirts of urban
areas that have since proliferated. Despite the country’s small size and
high population density, planners and the general public were still
locked into the mind-set of maximum population distribution in order to
establish national presence throughout the country. Awareness of the
scarcity of land and the urgency to conserve it came only as a result of
the crisis.
D. The Parliament And The Central Government19
Israel is a unitary state with a parliamentary political system. The
parliament— the Knesset— is composed of one hundred twenty
members in a single chamber. Aside from its legislative role, the
18. To present the full picture one should remember, though, that cumulatively the vast
majority of Israelis were (and still are) living in apartment buildings. Furthermore, the new ground-
attached housing, though regarded as very low-density for Israeli urban areas, was typically planned
at twelve units to the net acre, which in the United States and Canada would be regarded as rather
high densities.
19. The following two sub-sections also appear in a somewhat different version in
Rachelle Alterman, National-Level Planning in Israel: Walking the Tightrope Between
Government Control and Privatization, in NATIONAL-LEVEL SPATIAL PLANNING IN
DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES: TIME FOR A REEXAMINATION (Rachelle Alterman ed., forthcoming
2000).
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parliament has no direct involvement in approving land use plans.
During most of Israel’s history, the Knesset has shown little interest
in urban and regional matters since much of Israel’s political agenda
has been pre-occupied with issues of war, peace, the future of the
occupied territories, and religious controversies. Until the early 1990s
only a handful of Knesset members would show up to meetings of the
Knesset Committee for Interior and Environmental Affairs where
bills related to land use or environmental planning are prepared for
legislation.20 This has changed only modestly in the 1990s, and even
that change is partially attributable to the crisis. Knesset committees
have become more open to interest groups, and a few more members
of the Knesset have become somewhat more interested in planning
affairs.
Although the country is divided into six statutory districts,
national government has not devolved any major powers to them.
Headed by an officer of the Ministry of the Interior, they are in
charge of oversight of local government and land use planning. Other
ministries also have administrative districts, but these are not
statutory, they only reflect administrative convenience (often their
boundaries do not even coincide with each other). Israel’s
constitutional structure vests within the central government all
residual executive powers not specifically assigned by law to local
government or to a specific agency.
Given the highly centralized structure of decisions, the high
involvement of central government in many aspects of land use
planning comes as no surprise. Some experts argue that Israel’s
geopolitical and internal needs justify a high degree of centralization
in policymaking.21 Yet, despite the absence of formal
decentralization, the national-level policymaking process and the
content of policies have de facto changed significantly. These
changes reflect the growing local-government assertiveness discussed
below, the accelerating trends of privatization of public services, and
the pullback of government involvement in housing supply.
Many national-level agencies make decisions that have a direct
20. As a pro-bono advisor to the Knesset Committee for Interior and Environmental
Affairs on major amendments to planning legislation, I can testify to this first-hand.
21. YEHEZKEL DROV, A GRAND STRATEGY FOR ISRAEL (1989) (Hebrew).
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bearing on urban and regional development. These include the
cabinet itself, most government ministries, several statutory bodies
directly entrusted with specific land use issues, and non-
governmental bodies that are unique to Israel’s historic context (such
as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund).
E. Local Governments and Their Relations with the Central
Government
There are approximately two hundred fifty local governments, of
which more than seventy are in the Arab sector. Local governments
are of three types: cities (approximately sixty), towns (approximately
one hundred thirty-five), and regional authorities (fifty-six). In
densely built-up Israel, the latter include not only agricultural land
but also an increasing number of ex-urban neighborhoods,
commercial, and industrial sites. The central government regards the
number of local authorities as too large and fiscally wasteful. Despite
the recommendations of several public commissions that the
government has set up over the past twenty years, however, few
mergers have yet been successfully completed because of local-
government resistance.22
Israel may be of the only advanced-economy country where no
major decentralization and devolution of powers have officially taken
place. The central government legally still retains most of the powers
it possessed when Israel was in its formative stages. Yet, since the
1980s, various incremental trends of decentralization have been
occurring without a legislative stamp.
On paper the legal powers of local authorities are weak and their
financial powers are severely constrained by the central government.
Israeli local governments are burdened by a whole gamut of
responsibilities. Legally and financially they are weaker than their
counterparts in most Western countries and much weaker than in the
22. Eran Razin, The Local-Governments Map in Israel for the Year 2020, in SPATIAL,
ECONOMIC AND MUNICIPAL ASPECTS (1997) (Hebrew); Eran Razin, Municipal Reform in the
Tel Aviv Metropolis: Metropolitan Government or Metropolitan Cooperation?, 14 ENV’T AND
PLANNING: GOV’T & POL’Y 39 (1996); Eran Razin & A. Hazan, Industrial Development and
Municipal Organization: Conflict, Cooperation and Regional Effects, 13 ENV’T & PLANNING:
GOV’T & POL’Y 297 (1995).
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United States. Most major budgetary decisions and spending require
central-government approval. All but the most prosperous local
authorities have a weak tax base, and are dependent on hefty central-
government transfers. In addition, land-use and development control
powers are highly centralized.23
This picture is, however, somewhat misleading; despite the rather
heavy central-government presence in many sectors, much of the
day-to-day development policy and initiatives— the things that affect
consumers most— are vested at the local level. Some local authorities
have learned all too well how to negotiate with the central
government to stave off “locally unwanted land uses” and to increase
their de facto autonomy despite central-government oversight
powers. Since the 1980s mayors have been elected directly rather
than as heads of a party slate. There is nothing like political
competition among candidates to bring out the best of initiatives and
creative action. Proactive mayors have taken two main routes to
increase their resources. They lobby the central government and their
own political party for more resources, and they use creative ways of
getting developers to participate in the upgrading of public services to
the dismay of the central government.24
One may see below how crisis-time legislation tried to roll the
clock back to a more centralized structure— and what were the
results.
II. THE PRE-CRISIS STATUTORY PLANNING SYSTEM
Even before the crisis, Israel’s planning and development control
system was highly centralized, encompassing most of the powers any
planner might wish for, in order to implement central-government
policy and coordinate the actions of the various government
23. For an international comparison of levels of centralization regarding land use
planning, see Rachelle Alterman, National-Level Planning in Democratic Countries: A
Comparative Perspective, in NATIONAL-LEVEL SPATIAL PLANNING IN DEMOCRATIC
COUNTRIES: TIME FOR A REEXAMINATION (Rachelle Alterman ed., forthcoming 2000).
24. LIRIT MARGALIT & RACHELLE ALTERMAN, FROM FEES TO CONTRACTS: METHODS
FOR ENCOURAGING DEVELOPERS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND
SERVICES (1998) (Hebrew).
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bureaus.25 Yet, when the mass-immigration crisis began, there was
little forward planning for accelerated growth. There were few land
reserves with approved plans for development in major urban areas.
Those outlying development towns that did have such reserves were
the targets of the population distribution ideology but had few
employment opportunities. There was no comprehensive national
development planning but rather a series of sectoral national plans.
To understand how this situation came about in a country that still
viewed itself as a nation being built and that had ample legal planning
powers, one must take a deeper look at the statutory planning system
and the decision modes related to it.26
A. The 1965 Planning and Building Law27
The l965 Planning and Building Law replaced the legislation
introduced by the British in l922 and l936 during their Mandate over
Palestine, which had remained in force after the establishment of
Israel in 1948.28 The 1965 law kept intact most of the local-planning
attributes of the pre-state legislation and added several important
changes. Until 1965 planning controls did not apply to government
bodies. The l965 law required all government jurisdictions— central,
district, or local— as well as defense-related land uses (which have
special procedures in the law) to abide by its regulations and
procedures. Thus, since 1966 government construction— say, by the
Ministry of Construction and Housing— has had to follow the same
procedure as the private developer. The story of the unsuccessful
attempt to change that norm at the height of the crisis is told below.
The l965 legislation along with its (minor) amendments, controls all
25. Ernest R. Alexander et al., Evaluating Plan Implementation: The National Statutory
Planning System in Israel, in 20 PROGRESS IN PLANNING (1983).
26. For more detail on the statutory planning system and its operation prior to the crisis
see Ernest R. Alexander et al., Evaluating Plan Implementation: The National Statutory
Planning System in Israel, in 26 PROGRESS IN PLANNING MONOGRAPH SERIES (1983);
RACHELLE ALTERMAN & MIRIAM ROSENSTEIN, ISRAEL’S AGRICULTURAL LAND PROTECTION
POLICY: THE LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION (1992) (Hebrew). For an updated view see
Alterman, supra note 19.
27. This section, in somewhat different forms, also appears in Alterman, supra note 19.
28. Laws of the State of Israel (l965). (Official translations are available in English only until
the early 1980s, thus not covering many later amendments.)
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planning and development in Israel until today.29 Figure 1 presents the
institutional format. Almost every significant planning decision at the
local level, big or small, requires the approval of the District Planning
and Building Commission composed of fifteen members (since 1995,
sixteen). Nine (since 1995, ten) are representatives of central-
government ministries, five are representatives of local authorities in the
district, and one is a non-government professional. The Minister of the
Interior has extensive oversight powers regarding the appointment of
the local-government representatives to the National Board and the
District Commission and his representative chairs both the National
Board and the District Commissions. The minister also has specific
powers regarding the approval of local plans— he can call-in any such
plan for his further review.
In 1965 the Planning and Building Law established national
planning and placed it above the two existing tiers— the local level
and the district level. The result is a three-tier edifice of planning
institutions and a parallel set of plans, in a system that combines
centralized, top-down planning with bottom-up initiative. This system
calls for a coordinated hierarchy of plans, from the national, through the
district, down to the local levels. Every lower-order plan is legally
bound to adhere to higher-order plans, and any deviation (unless pre-
authorized in the higher plan) is illegal. In Floridian planning terms, full
consistency is required. Every action of construction or demolition,
small or big, requires a building permit (see Figure 2).
B. National Statutory Plans
The top tier consists of national plans prepared by the National
Planning Board and approved by the Cabinet. The language of the law
speaks about “the national plan,” indicating that the legislators probably
expected that the entire country would be covered by a single,
comprehensive national plan. In practice, no such comprehensive plan
was initiated until 1990, and it is my assessment that no such plan
would have been prepared for many years, or generations, were it not
29. Note that according to international law, this law, like all domestic legislation, applies to
Israel in its pre-1967 borders and has no jurisdiction over areas in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip
still held in occupation.
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Local Planning and Building Commissions
(approx. 100)
Local
Building-Permits
Authority
(established in 1996
following Amendment 43)
Appeals Committee
District Planning and Building Commissions (6)
Appeals
committee
The National Planning and Building
Board
Figure 1: Institutional structure under the Israel
Planning and Building Law of 1965
(In December  1999 the Cabinet
decided to establish a National Planning
Authority under the Prime Minister’s
Office. This decision requires Knesset
legislation. It is presently not clear there
will be a majority in support)
The Minister of the Interior
The Cabinet
Coastline
Waters
Commission
Commission
for the
Preservation
 of Agricultural
Land and
Open Space
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for the mass-immigration crisis. (The well-known exception— the
Population Distribution Plan described below— was comprehensive
only in the geographic sense.) Instead, the National Board concentrated
on sectoral plans— ones initiated by sectoral agencies. Most of these
plans have proven to be extremely important instruments for shaping
development according to national policy, but together, have not added
up to a comprehensive policy.
Unlike the lower types of plans, the public has no right to submit
objections to national plans and there is no requirement for a public
hearing (although in recent years the Board sometimes does hold
informal hearings at its discretion). This indicates the importance
attributed to these plans by the 1965 legislators. All lower-level plans—
district plans, local outline plans, and detailed plans— must be fully
consistent with the national plans. Otherwise, they would be illegal and
so would be any building permits issued according to them. These
plans are thus binding on both public agencies and private actors.
Although the rationale for some of the plans may initially have been to
promote development, in practice, since these plans are statutory
documents best geared to serve a regulative role, their usual effect is
restrictive. Any large-scale development would likely encounter one or
more national plans with which it would have to contend. It is therefore
not surprising that during the crisis, the role of the existing national
plans became a problem that needed overcoming.
C. Sectoral National Statutory Plans
Each of the approximately thirty sectoral plans prepared to date (the
consecutive list is thirty-eight but some have been aborted) deals with a
subject area that is authorized in the law and that members of the Board
regard as having national importance. These plans tend to be detailed
traditional land use plans. The range of sectoral national land use plans
is probably unique to Israel. In other countries some of these topics are
dealt with by separate national legislation, while others are not handled
on the national level but rather on the regional or local levels.30
The list of sectoral plans, most prepared before the crisis, includes
30. See Alterman, supra note 23.
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highways, airports, railroads, parks and nature reserves, surface and
underground water reservoirs, tourism, coastlines, and mining and
forests. It also includes a whole range of LULU’s, which in a small
country are viewed as national-level interests: power plants, cemeteries,
garbage and hazard-waste disposal sites, prisons, sewage purification
plans, oil and gas pipelines, telecommunication sites, and even gas
stations (happily, the latter anachronistic has been phased-out).
These plans, though “only” sectoral, have played a major and
essential role in shaping Israeli land use, in supplying services, and in
protecting its environment. Were it not for the plan for roads— one of
the earliest to be approved after the 1965 law came into effect— the
rights of way would probably have been gnawed up, and in land-tight
Israel, alternatives would not have been easily forthcoming.
Similarly, water reservoirs and coastline areas would have been built
up. Were it not for the plan for parks and nature reserves prepared in
the 1970s, open space protection would have had to rely only on the
Commission for the Preservation of Agricultural Land, which, even
before the crisis, had proven only partially effective.31 The few
contiguous high-quality open landscapes, such as the Carmel
Mountain National Park, would have probably become real-estate
sites long ago and certainly would not have resisted crisis-time
pressures. The plan for afforestation has managed to preserve, at the
very “last moment” in 1991, some of the extant open spaces not
previously declared as parks. The coastline preservation plan dated
from the 1980s has attempted to protect the remaining open coastline
(a gold mine in real-estate), with only partial success.
D. The National Plan for Population Distribution (Number 6)
Some analysts mistakenly regard this plan as the national plan.32 The
population distribution policy (NPG) has been the most long-standing
and consistent urban and regional policy, a legacy from Israel’s
formative years. While the first versions of this plan were issued in the
31. RACHELLE ALTERMAN & MIRIAM ROSENSTEIN, ISRAEL’S AGRICULTURAL LAND
PROTECTION POLICY: THE LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION (1992) (Hebrew).
32. See, e.g., OREN YIFTACHEL, PLANNING A MIXED REGION IN ISRAEL: THE POLITICAL
GEOGRAPHY OF ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS IN THE GALILEE 95-98 (1992).
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1950s,33 the first statutory version was approved in 1975 and
(unofficially) updated in 1985. During the crisis, National Plan 6 came
to be viewed as an obstacle to rapid growth.34
The National Plan for Population Distribution set quantitative
population caps or goals for each town and village. The rationale for
the caps was the desire to direct inhabitants and investments away
from the center to peripheral areas, against market forces. A cap
lower than the estimated demand was placed on towns and cities in
the central area, while an overly optimistic growth goal was placed
on towns in the peripheries.
The effectiveness of the National Plan for Population Distribution
has been lower for existing urban areas and higher for areas of new
development. The population caps placed on existing towns had only
a marginal effect since the plan was not geared to control incremental
infill. Thus while no major city halted its population intake because
of this plan, it did have some effect in controlling major new urban
expansions. The plan has been most effective in regulating the
establishment of new towns or villages. These could not be allowed
unless the site was previously indicated in the national plan,
otherwise, the plan would have to be amended accordingly.
Thus, if during the crisis, government authorities such as Housing
and the Lands Administration (usually in coalition with Finance, the
Prime Minister’s Office, Transportation, and Infrastructure) had wanted
to use the growth momentum to establish new neighborhoods or whole
towns beyond what had been envisaged in the national population-
distribution plan, they would have had to apply to the National Planning
Board for an amendment. However, there they would have had to
contend with the increasing environmental awareness that developed
33. J. DASH & E. EPHRAT, THE ISRAEL PHYSICAL MASTER PLAN (1964).
34. One senior-level planner, Sophia Eldor, the head of the urban-planning department in the
Ministry of Housing, blames the planners of the National Plan for Population Distribution for
making a “colossal error” in calculating the needs of Israeli towns. She asserts that by focusing on
population-growth estimates, they were oblivious to the fact that growth in floor-area consumption
per person for housing, industries, public services, and commerce was on a much steeper curve than
population growth. Eldor argues that this error led to a gross underestimation of the number of
housing units, public services, and land reserves necessary even in normal-growth times and has led
to an abysmal failure in preparing for the crisis. It is, therefore, no surprise that during the crisis, the
National Plan for Population Distribution was viewed by policymakers as an impediment that had to
be pushed aside or re-formed.
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Figure 2: The Hierarchy of Statutory Plans with Which a
Building Permit Must Abide
District Outline Plans
Local Outline Plans
Detailed Plans
Building Permits
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during the 1980s and was increasingly promoted by other members
around the table of the Board, such as the Ministry of the Environment,
Agriculture, Health, the Nature Reserves and Parks Authority, the
representative of the “green,” and of academia.
Those concerned with meeting crisis-time growth needs thus had
two alternative paths: to introduce legislation to downgrade the status
of the national-level plans themselves, so that crisis-time
development initiatives would override the Population Distribution
Plan and other growth-limiting plans; or to initiate a new national
plan that would be more development-friendly to the country’s
central district where employment opportunities for the new
immigrants would be more ample. Crisis-time action took both of
these paths, as I report later.
E. District Plans
On the second tier are the district plans to be prepared for each of
Israel’s six statutory administrative districts. The function of these
plans is to translate the national plans to the district level and to
coordinate among local plans. District plans have always been of less
importance than either the national plans or the local plans, perhaps
because they are sandwiched in-between these two levels. During the
crisis, too, they played a relatively minor role, mostly as derivatives
of national plans, but that meant that they too had a growth-
restraining effect. Since under the Planning and Building Law local
plans must be fully consistent with the district plans, during the crisis,
decision-makers also targeted district plans for downgrading in
power.
F. Local plans
At the lower level are mandatory local outline plans and optional
detailed plans. These are the main instruments for regulating
development, and any new housing construction, private or public,
must usually be anchored in them. These types of plans, which
usually grant (or restrict) development rights, provide legally binding
directives on land use, bulk, height, design guidelines, road and other
infrastructure layout, and environmental mitigation. American
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readers may view outline plans as similar to zoning regulations
combined with either elements of a comprehensive plan or with
elements of a PUD; but unlike the debate in American planning law
on the degree to which a comprehensive plan is binding, under Israeli
law outline plans are strictly binding. Detailed plans and building
permits must be fully consistent with the outline plan. In American
terms detailed plans are akin to a merger between subdivision
regulations and site plans or planned unit developments. Continental
European readers will easily recognize Israeli outline and detailed
plans as similar to local plans and detailed plans common in most
Continental countries; while British readers can view outline plans as
similar to pre-1947 British local schemes.
The ostensibly mandatory language of the law may have led one to
assume that local outline plans would be prepared for each municipal
area in its entirety and updated regularly. In fact, most local authorities
have not prepared a comprehensive outline plan for decades. The law
has been interpreted to mean that it is necessary to have some approved
outline or detailed plan on hand in order to grant development permits,
not necessarily a comprehensive one. Therefore, instead of original
plans, most urban local authorities have a quilt of countless
amendments to some older partial outline plan. In pre-state cities the
original plan was usually prepared under the British before 1948, while
in new towns it was prepared by the Ministry of Housing in the 1950s
or 1960s, when most of the new towns were established. Outline-
amendment plans usually incorporated the function of the detailed plan
so as to enable building permit to be issued. This means that the two-tier
structure on the local level, envisaged by the 1965 legislators, has in the
vast majority of cases collapsed into one tier, a site-specific, developer
initiated “amendment to the outline plan”— not unlike zoning practices
that have been documented by Mandelker three decades ago as
prevalent in the United States.35
The result was that in the Israeli planning system, local plans could
be characterized as “the tail wagging the dog.”36 This was just as true on
35. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA: A LEGAL STRATEGY FOR URBAN
CHANGE (1971).
36. Rachelle Alterman, Decision-Making in Urban Plan Implementation: Does the Dog
Wag the Tail or the Tail Wag the Dog?, 3 URB. L. & POL’Y 41 (1980).
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the eve of the crisis. Moreover, since plan-making and approval took,
and still takes, a notoriously long time, the double-tier local planning
process meant that, by the time a building permit was issued, both the
outline and the detailed plan following it, would often be outdated. This
reality left little room for long-range, comprehensive planning on the
local level. Indeed, on the eve of the crisis, most Israeli cities and towns,
aside from a few smaller, outlying development towns, had virtually no
land reserves with approved plans for large-scale expansion; most land
reserves were locked under agricultural designation.
G. Development Control and Agricultural Land Preservation
On the eve of the crisis, Israel had (and de jure still has) one of the
most stringent agricultural land protection polices in the world, where
most of the land was classified as agricultural. Agricultural land
preservation in Israel had several formidable layers, each intended to
protect farmland from conversion for development. Cumulatively, these
layers constituted a wall of legal-fiscal instruments unparalleled in any
other country.37 As might be expected, this concrete wall would be seen
as an obstacle to rapid development during the mass-immigration crisis
and would become a target for change.
The first and ostensibly most intransigent layer is embedded in
Israel’s public land ownership and long-standing policies in the rural
sector. Recall that the majority (some ninety-three percent) of Israel’s
total land area is public. Communal and cooperative village associations
(kibbutzim and moshavim), the backbone and major part of Israeli
agricultural production, are all sited on public land. In each rural
community a battery of three to four contracts (longterm leases or
automatically renewed rental contracts) applies to each tract of land: the
first sets the obligations of the individual household toward the Lands
Administration; the second sets the obligations of each household to the
local Agricultural Association; the third deals with the obligations of the
Association to the Lands Administration. Sometimes there is also a
fourth contract between the Association and the Jewish Agency, which
37. For a cross-national analysis, see Rachelle Alterman, The Challenge of Farmland
Preservation: Lessons From a Six-Country Comparison, 63 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 220
(1997).
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is a quasi-government organization that provides rural planning and
agricultural training support to many of Israel’s agricultural villages.
Most of these contracts have a clause that designates the land for
agricultural or related uses only. Each contract clearly stipulates that
upon change to non-agricultural use, the land must be returned to the
Lands Administration. Such conversion must, of course, be done only
with the approval of the planning bodies.
The second layer of agricultural land preservation is related to the
annexation powers of local authorities. As in Britain and the
Netherlands, and unlike many American local governments, local
authorities in Israel have no independent powers of annexation or self-
incorporation. These are vested with the Minister of the Interior. The
minister, who is also responsible for the Commission for the
Preservation of Agricultural Land (see below), may use farmland
preservation as a consideration in allowing or rejecting municipal-
boundary changes. In fact, before the crisis boundary expansions were
infrequent, and the ministers used to drag out decisions on boundary
expansion requests for many years. Local authorities did not count on
boundary extension as a practical, predictable solution for growth, and
in “steady state Israel” of the 1980s there was not too much need for it.
However, when mass immigration began, the boundaries of urban areas
and the slow process by which these were changed became a key
problem.38
The third layer of control of farmland conversion potentially lies in
the plan-making and development-control powers under the 1965
Planning and Building Law. That law singles out the protection of
agricultural land as a particular objective of all plans at the local,
district, and national levels, noting that designations of land uses should
be determined “with regard to the use of agricultural land.” However,
the legislators probably foresaw that in a fast-development country with
high urban-expansion pressures, it would not be enough to simply
specify agricultural land as a preferred purpose. They went on to
establish a fourth and ostensibly most formidable layer of protection
through a special mechanism and a dedicated institution under the
38. This point was brought out in an interview with Sophia Eldor, head of the Urban
Planning Department of the Ministry of Construction and Housing, in September 1995. The
interview was intended to give a crisis-retrospective view.
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Planning and Building Law.
The Planning and Building Law designates Schedule 1 as a special
set of regulations for controlling farmland conversions. The schedule is
a farmland conservationist’s dream. It sets up an all-powerful eleven-
member Commission for the Preservation of Agricultural Land (CPAL)
composed of representatives of central government bureaus, such as
Agriculture, Housing, the Lands Administration, as well representatives
of the farmers. The representative of the Minister of the Interior serves
as the chairperson. The CPAL is indeed a powerful and highly stationed
committee. It is highest in the hierarchy of planning agencies, alongside
the National Planning and Building Board. In fact, the CPAL is even
more powerful because every decision that impinges on agricultural
land requires the approval of the CPAL or its appeals board, and the
National Board cannot override their decision.39
The law specifies that conversions of agricultural land can only be
made in accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule,40 which
relates to the approval of any land use plan or building permit on
agricultural land. Thus, the law covers every possible avenue for
permitting development on farmland, whether privately or publicly
initiated. Plans at all levels, including district plans and national plans,
come under the jurisdiction of the First Schedule.
The restrictive implications of these multi-layers of controls is
further magnified by the CPAL’s 1968 decision to declare almost all of
the country’s developable land reserves as agricultural land, whether or
not they were in agricultural use or even suitable for agriculture. This
declaration occasionally included even areas within city boundaries.
The result of the agricultural land preservation policies was that
almost all inhabitable land reserves in the country were locked into
this citadel of conversion controls. Even had some policymakers
entertained the thought of releasing some of the agricultural land held
by the communal villages, there was little they could do about it.
Until the crisis the only land conversions allowed within the
39. Alterman, supra note 37.
40. Under Israeli law, as interpreted by the courts, no compensation is due for the act of
declaring land agricultural. However, extensive compensation rights do exist where approval of a
new plan or amendment reduces development rights. RACHELLE ALTERMAN & ORLI NAIM,
COMPENSATION FOR DECLINE IN LAND VALUES DUE TO PLANNING CONTROLS (1992) (Hebrew).
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boundaries of villages were restricted to small-scale industrial and
commercial uses to supplement the declining income from farming. It
was virtually unthinkable that any cooperative or communal villages
would entertain the thought of building a new neighborhood for non-
members within its boundary, and no mechanism existed for
compensating the village community members for the potential
development value of the land. In many cases, the development value
was high because of Israel’s small size and high density. Despite the
clear and repeated clauses in the battery of contracts, it would have
been unrealistic not to allow the villages to benefit from the potential
development value of the land they had cultivated for decades.
Given this system of controls against farmland conversion,
alongside the dearth of land reserves designated for development, it is
no surprise that during the crisis, the farmland protection system
became a target for criticism. The battery of farmland protection tools
was viewed as an obstacle to the capacity to build new housing and
other services for the large population influx.
H. The Suitability of the “Regular” Statutory Planning System for
Crisis-Time Decisions
In summary, even before the crisis the Planning and Building Law
and the planning system under it had come under severe criticism. The
criticism centered on the multi-layered approval process and the
rampant delays. Statutory planning was regarded as chronically
lethargic, and it came to symbolize an unnecessary impediment to
economic development. While the problem of perceived excessive
delay in development approval is not unique to Israel,41 in Israel it has
been viewed as the major problem in the planning system. Israeli
sensitivity to this issue may be due to the fact that Israel’s demographic
and economic growth rates are both higher than most other advanced-
economy countries.
Not surprisingly; when the immigration crisis broke, the single
major target for legislative change was the Planning and Building Law
and the planning system. The story of how this happened and what
dilemmas it created for planners is the focus of part III. The second
41. Cf. 19 (for a ten country comparison); Callies, supra note 10 (for Hawaii) (1994).
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major target for change was the prime status of the national statutory
plans. Among the national plans that attracted most criticism was the
National Plan for Population Distribution. In parts III and IV I report
why the status of national plans was weakened.42
A third important target for crisis-time policy change was the
system of agricultural-land control. Three needs drove the change:
the need to reduce the extensive powers of the CPAL, the need to
declassify some of the land reserves hitherto classified as agricultural,
and the need to enable relaxation of the clauses in the leasehold or
rental contracts that demand reversion of the lease in cases of
farmland conversion. I report on the first two in this Article, but not
on the third, which merits a separate analysis.43
III. HOW THE CRISIS-TIME LEGISLATION CAME ABOUT
A. Seeking Solutions for the Rapid-Growth Challenge
For several critical months beginning in October-November 1989,
when early conjectures about a change in USSR emigration policies
became concrete, until some time in the winter of 1990, government
institutions could best be characterized as being in a state of shock.
Although the first Knesset debate about rumors of an imminent
immigration wave took place as early as April 5, 1989, that
discussion did little to assuage the feelings of helplessness and the
criticism of inaction within the cabinet and government
departments.44 When in the fall of 1989 it became clear that a flood
of immigrants was on its way and that the crisis was imminent,
decision-makers scurried around for solutions.
The senior planner of the Ministry of the Interior argued: “Not to
worry— there are tens of thousands of potential additional housing
units within approved or nearly-approved plans— some on public
42. In this article I am not recounting the story of how planners’ timely initiative actually
succeeded in using the crisis to strengthen rather than weaken comprehensive national planning for
Israel’s post-crisis future. See Alterman, supra note 14.
43. I deal with this issue in a forthcoming paper on Isarel’s public leasehold system.
Rachelle Alterman, Leasehold Land: Israel’s Large-Scale System in the Era of Privatization
(2000) (paper prepared for the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, Mass., for a
seminar on public leaseholds, June 1-2, 2000).
44. KNESSET PROCEEDINGS 1989, 21 (Hebrew).
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land, others on private land. The Ministry of Housing and the private
developers should stop complaining and pull up their sleeves to begin
construction!” In fact, however, most of these potential units had
been on paper for years but were not implementable because of
various hurdles such as complicated land tenure, inadequate
accessibility or services, and controversy on environmental issues. By
contrast, the chief planner of the Lands Administration stated that his
agency had enough land reserves for release. If only the statutory
planning and development-control process were more speedy, he
said, there would be no problem in meeting the housing and urban-
development needs brought about by the crisis.
While politicians and professionals were still immersed in delay,
denial, and deflection of blame, immigrants were arriving in ever-
increasing numbers, usually at night because Israel’s only
international airport could not accommodate them by day. Each
passing month set a new record. In summer 1990 the more
conservative estimates of expected immigration ran at one to one and
one-half million within three to five years— two hundred to three
hundred thousand immigrants per year. Some estimated even more.
With every passing day when massive housing production could not
commence brought closer the ominous threat of mass
homelessness— an intolerable idea for Israeli policymakers and
society.45
Almost immediately after the crisis broke out, in early 1990,
senior government planners started setting up the rudimentary
planning elements to meet housing needs. The idea was to locate
public land reserves that were vacant and quickly developable. An
informal team of the chief planners of the Lands Administration, the
Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of the Interior, joined by the
Ministry of Finance (as watchdog?) started meeting unofficially even
before any Cabinet decisions were made. The team began to scan all
available maps and plans countrywide for tracts of land available for
development. Their target was to accommodate housing construction
for three hundred to five hundred thousand new units quickly and on
a cost-effective scale. In Israel’s land-tenure pattern, as described in
45. For a detailed discussion of the role of housing as a major element of crisis-time
policy, see Alterman, supra note 14.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/29
p773+Alterman.doc 01/04/01
2000] Land Use Law in the Face of a Rapid-Growth Challenge 799
part I, these conditions effectively ruled out extensive reliance on
private land.
The availability of public land thus became the leading guiding
force in siting new public-program housing. Many of the specific
plans for housing projects later submitted for statutory approval,
followed in the footsteps of these prior decisions. The decisions
reached under such pressure early in the crisis were to determine
most of the large-scale development initiatives during the crisis, and
thus they left a huge long-range imprint on the country’s land use,
environment, social structure, etc.
B. The Race for New Fast-Track Legislation
In June-July 1990 a legislative race developed between the
Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of the Interior. Neither wanted
to be caught holding the “hot potato” of stalled construction. The
major stumbling block in the eyes of the decision-makers was the
lengthy approval procedures for plans and building permits. Minister
Sharon— the well-known Israel politician with a “can-do” public
image who was in charge of Housing— instructed his staff to develop
emergency legislation that would allow his office to act with as few
impediments as possible. His original intention was probably that the
emergency regulations would exempt all state-constructed housing
units from the planning agencies, proceed without a building permit,
and be exempt from some of the construction, safety, and security
standards.46 However, Sharon’s initiative was criticized, so the first
batch of emergency regulations was issued for a limited number of
units on a trial basis.
On July 2, 1990 Sharon issued and duly published emergency
regulations according to clause 9 of the 1948 Administrative and
Legal Procedures Ordinance (the formative legislation when Israel
was established). On July 1 the majority of Cabinet members
authorized Sharon’s initiative, with the Minister of the Interior
46. Recall that unlike the law prevalent in the United States, where federal and state
governments do not need local-government permission for some of their construction
initiatives, in Israel, since 1966 government-initiated construction has had to receive the same
approval and permits as private construction.
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objecting.47 These regulations, titled Emergency Plans for the
Construction of Housing Units— 1990 authorized the Ministerial
Committee for Immigrant Absorption to approve emergency plans for
housing, not exceeding three thousand units in total, to be constructed
in ten local authorities as specified. The regulations set up the
following procedure: Copies of the plans would be presented to seven
government agencies as specified, and these may bring their
comments to the ministerial committee within seven days. Once a
plan has been approved, the minister of housing is authorized to take
any action in order to construct housing units, including the erection
of imported mobile units, or construction of the entire infrastructure.
These actions will not require any permit or approval according to
any existing law or regulation. A plan once approved will override
any and all plans approved according to the Planning and Building
Law. Like all emergency regulations under Israeli law, these would
expire after three months (unless extended).
The idea of emergency regulations was distasteful to the Minister
of the Interior, Arie Derii, who was in charge of the Planning and
Building Law. If Sharon were allowed to implement his emergency
regulations, this would be a public acknowledgement that Ministry of
Interior, in charge of planning procedures, was an impediment to the
national effort. So, Derii sought to toss the “hot potato” away from
his team and back into Housing’s. Derii therefore instructed the
senior planners and legal advisors on his staff to speedily draw up
alternative parliamentary legislation that would reflect crisis needs by
drastically speeding up land use planning and building-permitting
procedures. This would be a compromise, but it would still maintain
the basic rationale of planning controls and of parliamentary
legislation rather than emergency regulations.
In June-July 1990 the race between the two ministers reached the
Knesset floor. When Sharon’s emergency regulations, only requiring
“deposit” before the Knesset, were issued on July 2, Derii’s bill was
already undergoing preliminary legislative procedures. Being a
regular, non-emergency piece of legislation, the new bill required the
47. Under certain circumstances government ministers have authority to legislate
emergency regulations. These do not need Knesset approval and only need to be deposited for
Knesset review.
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regular legislative process by the Knesset that includes three readings
and, after the first reading, clearance by the relevant parliamentary
committee. The chair of the Knesset Committee for Interior and
Environmental Affairs, Yehoshua Matza, wrote to Sharon on June 26,
bringing to the minister’s attention that the Ministerial Legislative
Committee was already in the process of reviewing a special planning
and building bill and that the legislative proceedings are expected to
be especially quick. Matza stated that the bill “is intended to place in
your [Sharon’s] disposal means for construction without delay. The
Knesset Interior Committee has asked the Minister that before he
makes a decision regarding the emergency regulations, he would
meet with the Committee and the Minister of the Interior.”48
The emergency regulations were issued nevertheless. On July 9,
1990 while the new bill was in advanced stages of Knesset
legislation, Sharon thus replied to a question posed by M.K. Poraz:
I would like to tell you all: These regulations are intended to
create a sample test case— to fight bureaucracy, shorten
procedures. I know there are those who are afraid of
emergency regulations. If there is something that should worry
us, it is not these regulations which are limited to a short time
period and a small number of buildings.49
Sharon’s unofficial justification for issuing the emergency
regulations may have also been that the Knesset deliberations, as was
their wont, would take a long time. The crisis atmosphere, however,
proved so powerful that it drastically altered the pulse of
parliamentary decision making.
With a sense of urgency, on July 2 1990 the Knesset approved the
first reading of the proposed law titled The 1990 Planning and
Building Procedures (Interim) Law and passed it on for clearance by
the Committee for Interior and Environmental Affairs. However,
despite the crisis atmosphere, the proposed bill drew a great deal of
48. H.C. 2994/90, Avraham Poraz (member of Knesset) vs. The Government of Israel,
Minister of Construction and Housing, and Minister of Interior, 44(3) P.D. 317. All translations
from Hebrew are by the author. There are no official English versions.
49. H.C. 2994/90, Avraham Poraz (member of Knesset) vs. The Government of Israel,
Minister of Construction and Housing, and Minister of Interior, 44(3) P.D. 317.
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criticism, especially by the “green” groups and by academics, who
argued that the proposed law goes too far in its streamlining efforts.50
For a while it seemed that the legislative process would, indeed, not
be quick. During the intensive subcommittee meetings, which I
attended as a pro-bono advisor, Interior’s planners and legal advisors
argued that the drawn-out procedures required by the existing
planning law were unsuited for handling crisis-time rapid growth
needs. They reminded all that their proposal was the least of two
evils, and if not adopted, Sharon’s emergency regulations would
likely be expanded and extended. The promoters of the new law also
knew well that Knesset members disliked the emergency regulations
because these circumvent the Knesset itself.
So, despite the many concerns of Knesset members and of various
interest groups about the new law,51 only a few minor changes were
introduced into the bill. Within a single week it had gone through the
committee approval process and on July 11 it sailed through second
and third readings by the Knesset. The Knesset legislated the new law
as an Interim Law, with a self-terminating clause after two years
unless extended. The Interim Law came into force upon its official
publication on July 20 1990.
Meanwhile, the Minister of Housing did not easily relinquish his
proposed emergency powers. In theory, the two crisis-based legal
tracks (alongside the “regular” planning law) might have existed side
by side for the full three-month period of the emergency regulations,
and these might even have been extended. However, a few days after
the Knesset enacted the Interim Law, on July 17, 1990, the High
Court of Justice heard a petition from a concerned Knesset member
(Avraham Poraz).52 The Court declared the emergency regulations
void. Giving the Minister of Housing three weeks to phase out the
Emergency Regulations, the High Court ruled that even during a
50. Rachelle Alterman, Building for Generations, HA’ARETZ, July 16, 1990 (Hebrew). The
article criticizes the reduced local-government, public participation, and professional scrutiny in
the proposed Interim Law.
51. KNESSET PROCEEDINGS, 16 (33, 34). Information for the sub-committee on Internal
and Environmental Affairs is based on the author’s participant-observation of that meeting.
52. Avraham Poraz, an attorney who had formerly been a legal advisor for planning
commissions can be counted among the handful of Knesset members interested in planning law
and procedures.
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situation of national urgency and crisis, a minister has the legal
authority to resort to emergency powers only if the problem at hand is
not adequately covered by Knesset laws. In this case, an appropriate
legislative solution (the Interim Law) was already on the Knesset
floor when the emergency regulations were issued. In Judge Levine’s
words (speaking for the Court):
There is no doubt that immigrant absorption is an “essential
action” par excellence, especially these days, when thousands
of immigrants are streaming into Israel and the entire nation
aligns itself to the absorption project. Under these
circumstances it is necessary to take up unconventional means,
to overcome bureaucratic stumbling blocks and to recruit
resources in order to organize quickly and efficiently for this
important mission. Likewise, we have no reason to doubt that
the Minister believes in good faith that enactment of
emergency regulations is the right way to achieve the urgent
goals of immigrant absorption and to solve the general housing
problem. The appellants have not seriously challenged the fact
that such regulations fall under the general authority in clause
9 of the Ordinance. Nevertheless, the emergency regulations
do contain far-reaching statements: Bypassing Knesset
legislation, obliviousness to the plans approved under the
Planning and Building laws, and exemption from licenses,
permits, and approvals. Any error made in such issues might
become “a lamentation for generations” [a Hebrew idiom]. It
may be that this is a necessity, but if there is a possibility that
during the same time period the legislative arm would give its
attention to the matter at hand, the executive branch should
withhold the enactment of emergency regulations.53
Many policymakers and planners both within and outside
government circles welcomed the High Court decision. They had
been unhappy about the constitutional and practical impacts of
resorting to emergency legislation in such a crisis. After all, the
53. H.C. 2994/90, Avraham Poraz (member of Knesset) vs. The Government of Israel,
Minister of Construction and Housing, and Minister of Interior, 44(3) P.D. 317.
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immigration crisis was not like a natural disaster or a war, the kinds
of situations for which emergency regulations were primarily set up.
IV. THE CRISIS-TIME INTERIM PLANNING AND BUILDING
PROCEDURES LAW
The 1990 Planning and Building Procedures (Interim) Law
(henceforth, the Interim Law) has ten rather-long clauses that
establish special planning institutions and stipulate the limits of their
authority. Here I survey the major elements of the legislation and
some of their implications. The wording of the Interim Law and the
special circumstances in which it was born have left several legal
questions unanswered. Despite its relatively short life, the law did
come before the High Court of Justice on several occasions, and the
Court had several opportunities to interpret some of its clauses.
Others will remain pending, probably never to be interpreted by
Israeli courts. I shall report on the relevant decisions under each of
the subheadings where I present the elements of the law.
A. The Law’s Major Elements and Their Interpretation by the High
Court
1. Objectives
The Interim Law states its objectives in clause 1:
“This law sets up, for an interim time, special arrangements for
approval of plans for construction [i.e. development], in order to
enable urgent alignment to find a solution for the housing and
employment needs in the nation— for absorbing immigrants, young
couples, housing-less people, and employment.”54 Clause 1 obviously
raises many legal questions: Should the law be interpreted as
applying to housing specifically intended for the designated group
(immigrants, young couples, and households that do not have
adequate housing)? Or is it the law’s objective to increase the general
pool of housing in Israel so that, through the trickle down process,
more housing would presumably become available for the designated
54. All translations from Hebrew are by the author.
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groups? The explanatory note attached to the bill spoke about
increasing the general pool of housing, so it was clear that the
legislators’ intent was that the new law should not be restricted to
public housing only or to housing designated only for the groups
noted.55 However, it was not clear whether the objectives should also
include housing that is unlikely to reach the general pool, such as
luxury or vacation units. Furthermore: Does the reference to “urgent
alignment” mean that the Law’s authority is limited to situations
where there is a demonstrated urgency and where there is a high
probability that the planned housing or industry could be
implemented in the near future? Or does the new law authorize the
special planning bodies to approve any plan that meets the
quantitative standards set by the law (see below)?
The first time that the High Court of Justice had occasion to
interpret Clause 1 was in early 1992, in a petition (submitted by M.K.
Poraz and two city council members) against the Minister of
Housing, the Lands Administration, and others.56 The petitioners
challenged the legality of the decisions to allocate public land without
tender to five associations of homebuyers with a political
identification. Another association, created by a group of immigrants,
was not allocated land. The land had been declassified from its
agricultural status to housing and ancillary services by a plan
approved by the district’s Housing Construction Commission
established under the new law (the HCC— see below). The HCC’s
rationale for the reclassification was that the new housing would
serve for immigrant absorption. The respondents explained that this
statement meant only that any construction of housing indirectly
increased the supply of housing for the immigrants as well.
The court’s opinion cites and accepts this broad interpretation of
Clause 1, citing the explanatory note attached to the bill, and noting
that this interpretation has also been applied extensively in HCC
decisions. However, the Court expresses some dismay at the
misleading impression that the language of the law may have created
55. Explanatory note, Planning and Building Procedures (Interim) Bill, 1990. As
published in the official publication of bills, p. 218 [there is no official translation into English].
56. H.C. 5023/91, M.K Avraham Poraz et al vs. the Minister of Construction and
Housing, Ariel Sharon et al., 46(2) P.D. 793.
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and calls for the re-assessment of the law in accordance with the
experience accumulated in the year and a half since it was enacted.
The question of how to interpret Clause 1 came up a second time
before the High Court of Justice but was withdrawn before the court
made its decision. The case did, however, stimulate the Attorney
General to issue guidelines that interpreted the above objectives. The
circumstances were that the Likud government then in power,
through the Ministry of Housing, submitted a private planning
initiative for housing to the HCC. The area concerned was highly
controversial— sensitive archeologically and volatile politically—
located in the seam area between East and West Jerusalem. It was
clear to all that construction could not begin soon due to these
complications and that this housing would not be part of the general
pool that would meet the crisis-time needs, but it would cater only to
a few politically-motivated and rather well-off zealots. The clear
intention was to bypass the municipality of Jerusalem, which had
objected to passing this plan and would have not done so, had the
plan been submitted according to the regular planning and building
law.
The petitioners (of whom I was one) questioned the use the
authority granted by the Interim Law to approve housing proposals
that were clearly unrelated to the goal of increasing the housing
supply urgently to meet the crisis due to mass immigration.57 That
petition led the Attorney General to issue new guidelines to the
Housing Construction Commissions, in which he instructed them to
refrain from using the Interim Law in cases where the housing could
not be built in a reasonably short time or where it was unlikely to add
to the general housing pool.58 However, these guidelines were issued
only in 1992, when the mass immigration wave had already tapered
down and hundreds of thousands of housing units had already been
approved.
The need to interpret the Interim Law’s goals clause came before
57. H.C. Petitions 2819/92 and 2846/92, June 1992, Sara Kaminker, councilwoman, City
of Jerusalem et al. (including Alterman), vs. the Minister of Housing, Jerusalem district
Housing Commission, et. al. Withdrawn when the Attorney General issued new guidelines.
58. Memo from the Attorney General to the chairs of the Housing Commissions, dated
June 15, 1992, in response to the above-mentioned petitions to the High Court of Justice.
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the High Court of Justice once again in 1994, after the Attorney
General’s guidelines had been issued. The Maccabim case concerned
three local outline plans for the first two large neighborhoods to be
built in the new town of Modiin, located midway between Jerusalem
and Tel-Aviv.59 There was no prior outline plan approved for the new
town, only a non-statutory master plan. The three local outline plans
were in contradiction to the Central District Outline Plan. The
petitioners— residents of Maccabim, a small exurban neighborhood
already existing in the area— argued that the objectives of the Interim
Law do not include the approval of a new town in contravention of
higher-order plans and that partial local plans should not be approved
before an outline plan is prepared and approved for the new town as a
whole. The majority opinion (Judge Goldberg and Judge Tal) refers
in passing to the Attorney General’s guidelines, but rejects the
petitioners’ argument:
In this case, the authorities were faced with the housing
distress created during the climax in immigration toward the
end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991. This necessitated the
preparation of immediate plans for several thousand housing
units. Therefore it was decided that out of 16 areas that will
constitute the new town, when established, the plans for two of
the areas with 9000 units merit approval according to the
Interim law. The third judge, Dalia Dorner, disagreed and
issued a minority opinion. Noting that the new law is silent
about whether or not it should apply to a new town, she adds,
“establishment of a new town requires long-range planning. It
is not an appropriate subject for approval by streamlined
procedures by a limited committee [with members] of the
executive branch who are acting under a law whose purpose is
immediate construction.” Judge Dorner presents a detailed,
well-reasoned and well-supported argument, but her opinion
remained in the minority. I would conjecture that, had such a
59. H.C. 2683/92, Maccabim et al. v. the Housing Construction Commission for the
Central District et al., 48(1) P.D. 535.
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case come up at a date further removed from the crisis
atmosphere, Judge Dorner’s opinion would have been the
majority’s.
2. Substantive Authority
The Interim Law authorized the HCCs to review and decide only
on local plans— outline or detailed plans. In U.S. terms these would
be similar to zoning or rezoning decisions combined with site plans
or PUDs and subdivision plans. In Clause 4 the Interim Law specifies
several threshold conditions in the form of particular characteristics
of plans. Only when the following hold cumulatively would the
HCCs have authority to review the plan:
· If the proposed plan is for housing, it must include at least
two hundred housing units and may also include ancillary
public and commercial services. In rural townships one
hundred housing units are the threshold.
· Alternatively, the proposed plan may apply to an industrial
area that is already approved in a prior plan, and the new
plan provides either an extension of the industrial site or
further details.
· The plans must be detailed enough to enable direct issuance
of building permits without the need to approve further, more
detailed, plans.
· The law authorizes the HCCs to handle such plans, whether
submitted directly to it or whether transferred to it from one
of the “regular” planning bodies.
The intention of the legislation was to channel only particular
types of plans to the new process, while leaving other types of plans
to be approved under the regular planning law. Note, that the identity
of the developer or initiator is not a criterion. The choice was left in
the hands of each developer, public or private, whether to turn to the
new law and its institutions or to continue (or begin) procedures
under the regular system. Yet, the attractiveness of the streamlined
process offered by the new law was such that many parties, some
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/29
p773+Alterman.doc 01/04/01
2000] Land Use Law in the Face of a Rapid-Growth Challenge 809
quite unexpected by some of the decision-makers,60 tried to have their
plans approved according to the new law. At times that required some
stretching of the threshold criteria.
Two cases where such “stretching” was apparent came before the
High Court of Justice. The first opinion was delivered in June 1991,
while the immigrants were streaming into Israel and the fear of
massive homelessness was at its height.61 The plan in question was an
amendment to an approved outline plan in a quiet neighborhood in
Rehovot, a mid-sized town south of Tel Aviv. The original land use
designation was public buildings and open space, now to be
designated for temporary housing in mobile homes (“caravans”).
Thousands of such units had been imported by the Ministry of
Housing at the height of the crisis in fear of massive homelessness.
However, in order to meet the two hundred-unit threshold, the
Ministry of Housing drew the plan’s boundaries so as to encompass
two non-contiguous areas, one for sixty mobile homes, the other for
one hundred forty. The neighbors who petitioned the Court—
residents of a modest-housing neighborhood that was in the process
of extracting itself from decline— were quite unhappy with the idea
that mobile homes for new immigrants would be located adjacent to
their homes, even if temporarily. They argued that the HCC does not
have substantive authority to approve the plan because the
quantitative condition is not properly met. The Court rejected the
petition, thus diverting from its pre-crisis tendency to place the
protection of private property in high priority. The tone of the opinion
vividly reflects the fear of mass homelessness prevalent at that stage
in the crisis:
During these stressful times, when the housing problem
becomes more and more severe and there is danger that new
immigrants will remain homeless and that longterm residents
will also be homeless because of their inability to meet the
increase in housing costs, the Knesset has decided to legislate a
[special] law. It enables fast approval of development
60. I recall the surprise of some politicians and planners when they first discovered that
mayors of Arab-sector towns and villages were starting to use the Interim Law extensively.
61. H.C. 1125/1991, Marco Litman et al. v. The Housing Construction Commission,
Central District et al. (Not published).
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plans. . . . The limitation in the law for plans with at least 200
housing units is intended to prevent misuse of the law by
frequent submission of spot plans for a limited number of units
. . . But it is unimaginable that [the authorities] should be
required to do so contiguously. . . . We are sure that the
petitioners are aware of the importance of creating housing for
new immigrants and the homeless and that they will
understand and help in the absorption of the residents of the
“caravans” that will be put in place through cooperation and
mutual respect.
The second decision was delivered in December 1992, when the
monthly immigration rate was already declining.62 The petitioner, a
commercial developer, challenged the validity of a plan approved by
the HCC that amended an existing plan approved under the P&B
Law, adding more housing units to it. None of the housing units had
yet been built. The question was whether the HCCs were authorized
to approve a plan that proposes an increment of less than two hundred
housing units but amends a previously approved plan so that the total
number of units was over two hundred. The court saw no fault in this
interpretation of the Clause 4 condition, so long as the units had not
yet been constructed. In this decision, as in the above one, the Court
refused to read into Clause 4 conditions not explicitly stated there.
One cannot avoid noticing that the decision’s tone was no longer as
evocative and chastising as in the previous citation.
3. Creation of New Statutory Planning Institutions: A Centralized
“One-Stop” Decision Body
As a response to the crisis, government decision-makers and
legislators designed the new law with the aim of streamlining the
decision process and neutralizing possible local opposition and
exclusionary tendencies. The law creates new planning bodies that
would centralize decision-making powers.63 The legislators’
62. H.C. 988/1992, Rinunim Investment Co. Ltd et al. v. the Housing Construction
Commission, Central District et al., 47(1) P.D. 1.
63. There were some, but not many, voices of criticism, for example, Alterman, supra
note 50.
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assumption was that a higher degree of centralization would help to
curtail possible local opposition to housing construction and the
influx of immigrants and to speed up the decision process.
The law sets up a system that entirely bypasses the local planning
commissions. Under the regular system the local commissions are the
gatekeepers for almost all planning initiatives. The Interim Law
establishes a new district-level planning body so as to create a “single
stop” process of plan approval. These new bodies are to substitute for
both the district commission and the local commissions, ostensibly
combining the two. However, this combination is quite uneven in
powers.
In Clause 3 the Interim Law ordered that in each of the country’s
six districts, Housing Construction Commissions (HCC) be created.
They were to be smaller in membership, and thus presumably more
efficient, than the regular district commissions. They were usually
each composed of nine members, six representatives of the key
central-government ministries and three of the local government. The
central agencies represented were: Interior (the District Governor or
another representative of the Minister, and the District Planner or
another professional appointed by the Minister of the Interior),
Housing, the Lands Administration, Transportation, and the
Commission for the Preservation of Agricultural Land.64
In the case of plans for industrial sites (the minority), two more
central-government members would be added— Environmental
Quality, and Industry.65 The three representatives of the local
authority were to be the mayor, the municipal engineer (planner), and
one member of the elected municipal council. Thus, the Interim Law
not only bypassed the local planning commissions but also granted a
majority to central-government representatives on the new Housing
Commissions.
64. If an industrial-site plan were concerned, representatives of the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry and of the Ministry of the Environment would also be members. However,
industrial plans turned out to be a small minority of the plans submitted to the new Housing
Commissions.
 65. Where a plan for industry is concerned, the HCC must first submit it for review by an
advisory team that includes the local-authority engineer, the district planner, a representative of
the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and a representative of the Ministry of the
Environment.
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This minority representation of the local government was in fact even
less influential than its numeric proportion. The law stipulated that
the local representatives would become members of the commission
only if and when a plan under the jurisdiction of that town would
come up for approval and cease being members when another
municipality’s plan would be debated. The local level thus received a
“slap in the face.” Through this “warm seat” principle, the local
representatives would in effect be only ad hoc members of the HCC’s
when plans pertaining to their town were being considered. This
deprived local governments of much of the coalition-building and
give-and-take potential that is part of committee work and which the
central-government members of the commissions continued to enjoy.
The Interim Law had other implications for local governance that
may not be visible at first reading. The third local representative, in
addition to the mayor and engineer, is “another member of the local
council elected by the council.” Under the regular law, the Local
Commission is usually composed of the local council as a whole,
coalition and opposition alike. Under the Interim Law, however, one
could assume that in most cases the person elected to serve on the
HCC would likely be a member of the mayor’s coalition. The voice
of the opposition will not be heard. Many mayors soon discovered
that the HCCs could serve to bypass their own elected council.
4. Streamlining by Limiting Public Participation
The major rationale of the Interim Law was to cut approval time.
Just as in 1988, during the previous major initiative to amend the
P&B Law (Amendment 26), the legislators of the Interim Law
regarded public participation rights as the major cause for delays. In
both cases, I offered the legislators statistical proof that objections
from the public are not the major cause of delays in the plan-approval
process;66 but due to the crisis-time atmosphere, this information was
to no avail.67 The Interim Law streamlined the plan-approval process
66. My research was the first in Israel to study the planning law empirically. Ariella
Vraneski & Rachelle Alterman, Citizen Participation and Planning Laws: One Step Forward
and Two in Reverse (1990) (working paper, Klutznick Center for urban and Regional Studies,
Technion [Hebrew]).
67. My own input may have been of some help during the legislation of Amendment 26,
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at the expense of public-participation and public-information rights.
Clause 5 does so in six ways.
First, the Interim Law exempts all plans that come under its
jurisdiction from the obligation in the P&B Law to publish a notice
about the “decision to prepare a local outline or detailed plan” or
amendments to them (Clause 77). For various reasons, this obligation
was rarely met under the regular law, and court decisions did not see
such infringement as nullifying the subsequent approval process. The
courts regarded the deposit, not the preparation stage as the major
opportunity for citizens to exercise their rights to obtain information
and submit objections. However, given the much-shortened deposit
period under the Interim Law, one should not take lightly the
abolition of the Clause 77 publication obligation.
Second, the legislators drastically cut the time for deposit of
plans— the only stage under Israeli planning law where plans must be
accessible for public scrutiny and where interested parties have the
right to submit their opinion (called “objection”). This time period
was cut from two or three months under the regular law, to twenty
days, including weekends and holidays (a year later, after much
criticism, this period was extended to thirty days). The reduction in
plan deposit time should have been regarded as a drastic act in the
Israeli context, where most of the plans submitted are for medium or
high-density projects, and where scarcity of land reserves implies that
negative impacts on neighboring land uses would be likely. Members
of the public who wished to submit an effective objection would have
to do considerable homework, but under the time allocated under the
Interim Law, they were unlikely to have adequate time.
Third, approval was to be “automatic” if no objections were
submitted during these time periods, unless the HCC decided
otherwise within the same short time period allotted to objections.
This rule was a significant curtailment in participation opportunities.
Although under the regular law too, since the 1988 streamlining
Amendment 26, plans that have no objections come into force
automatically, the planning bodies have another thirty days in which
to decide whether they want to debate the plan further, insert
in that citizen input was not cut after all despite initial intentions.
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changes, or reject it. Furthermore, under the regular law it is a
prevalent practice that the planning commissions use their discretion
to accept statements of objection from interested parties even when
these are submitted late. The High Court of Justice in its decisions
has not seen any flaw in this practice. The Interim Law sought to
curtail such public-friendly discretion by stating that approval by
default would be presumed immediately after the official objection
time was over.
The automatic approval clause was the subject of a petition to the
High Court of Justice.68 Here, as in another decision to be cited
below, the High Court interpreted the Interim Law in ways that
minimize the infringement on the right to be heard. In the case
concerned the HCC for the Tel Aviv District mistakenly published
erroneous information in a notice about the deposit of a plan that was
submitted by the petitioner. No objection was submitted within the
twenty days. The mistake was discovered a little later, and the HCC
re-published a corrected notice. Several objections were submitted,
and the commission decided to accept one of them and changed the
deposited plan accordingly, to the dismay of the petitioner-initiator.
Furthermore, the commission decided that some third parties might
see themselves as injured from the change and decided to send them a
notice, as required by the regular planning law (and this requirement
was not abolished by the interim law). The petitioners argued that
according to the Interim Law, when twenty days have passed and no
objection has been submitted, the plan comes into force. The Court
decided otherwise, validating the HCC’s decision to re-publish the
notice and notify third parties. Clearly, the Court placed the
protection of due process over the interim law’s streamlining
objectives.
Fourth, under the regular P&B Law interested parties whose
objections have been rejected or who would like to object to the
adoption or rejection of a plan have the right to request permission to
submit an administrative appeal to the National Board. In the name of
speed, the Interim Law totally abolished all these appeal rights,
allowing no recourse to further administrative appeal. Injured parties
68. H.C. 4816/1991, Binyaney Gil Ltd. v. the Housing Construction Commission, Tel Aviv
District, 41(1) P.D. 44.
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were thus left with only a one-shot opportunity to submit an objection
and only a one-stop opportunity to be heard, without adequate checks
and balances.
Fifth, the Interim Law purposely eliminated (or sought to
eliminate) most of the checks and balances that exist under the
regular law to limit conflicts of interests and assure procedural due
process for those who submit objections. Under the regular law, a
District Commission that deposits a local outline or detailed plan
does not hear objections in its plenary format but rather through a
special sub-committee. By contrast, under the Interim Law, the full-
format HCC’s— precisely the same makeup that deposited the plan—
may hear objections to the plans and decide whether to accept them
and insert changes in the deposited plan.
The sixth and last item concerns how potential conflicts of
interests are handled and is, in many ways, most significant because
it is inherent in the very structure of the new planning bodies that the
Interim Law establishes. The Interim Law explicitly exempted the
members of the HCCs from Clause 23 in the regular law. That clause
stated that local-government representatives who act as members of
another planning body (such as a district commission) must not
participate in a vote concerning matters pertaining to their own local
authority.69 The Interim Law, as first enacted, had no other checks
against conflicts of interests, except for a general clause in the regular
law that protected against private, not public, conflicts of interests.
The notion that due process should be sacrificed was probably
consciously in the minds of the legislators of the Interim Law. Once
they decided to place the one-stop principle at the core of the new
law and determined the composition of the HCCs accordingly, they
sacrificed the separation between the local level that usually initiates
or supports a plan and the more disinterested district level that
decides to deposit plans and hears objections from the public. By
contrast, under the Interim Law, the composition of the HCCs is
based precisely on the representatives of executive agencies that are
likely to initiate plans: representatives of the local government, the
powerful representatives of the Ministry of Housing, the Lands
69. After the crisis in 1995, in Amendment 43 to the P&B Law, that clause was subsumed
under Clause 47A which sets out broader and stricter-yet criteria to avoid conflicts of interests.
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Administration, and other central-government agencies. The
legislators chose not to include in the HCCs any members who are
inherently objective and disinterested parties.
In a highly significant and well-known decision in 1993, Bregman
vs. the Housing Construction Commission of the Tel Aviv District, the
High Court of Justice dealt with the issue of conflict of interests in
the decision making by the HCCs.70 The case concerned a plan for
the highly attractive large Menshiya site in Tel Aviv, facing the
beach, owned by the state and viewed as one of the last vacant real
estate sites in the heart of the metropolis. For decades, that plan, in its
many versions, had been back and forth on the tables of the (regular)
planning commissions but had not been approved because it was
highly contested by neighbors and by the elected opposition in the
city council. The mayor of Tel Aviv (like many other mayors) seized
the opportunity of the Interim Law and the absence of representation
of the opposition to bring the plan to the HCC for approval. A
neighbor, displeased with the plan’s approval because it would shut-
out the view from his apartment, petitioned the High Court, arguing
that the decision process was faulty because the parties interested in
the plan’s approval— the mayor and the Lands Administration— were
members of the HCC and participated in the hearing where he
presented his objection.
Due to the petition, but before the High Court decided the case,
the Knesset amended the Interim Law to introduce a slight
improvement regarding the prevention of conflicts of interests.71 The
amendment specifically said, however, that it would not apply to
plans deposited before the amendment. Judge Bach, in his minority
opinion, came to a conclusion that in the Interim Law, the legislature
explicitly preferred efficiency to due process. Yet, the majority
opinion of judges Barak and Or, each using a different avenue of
reasoning (and some legal acrobatics), reached a different conclusion:
70. H.C. 3480/1991, Uri Bregman v. The Housing Construction Commission, Tel Aviv, U,
47(3) P.D. 716.
71. The amendment says: “Clause 23 of the P&B Law will not apply, but if a member of
the commission is a representative of a local authority, office, or another body that initiated a
particular plan before the commission, that member will be not be allowed to vote in connection
with objections submitted to that plan.”
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It is well rooted in our legal system, on the basis of court
decisions, that the law regarding the prevention of conflicts of
interests applies to members of any government body even
where there is no statutory instruction in this regard. So long as
there is no statement in the legislation that explicitly dismisses
the application of these rules, they apply, and are viable on
their own.
So, the High Court effectively re-introduced to the Interim Law
precisely those rules that the legislators sought to bypass. The Court
applied to the Interim Law the entire set of rules about avoiding
conflict of interests that the court had developed in its judgements
over decades. This decision, in fact, takes the rules of due process
further than before, applying them even to legislation where the
legislature clearly preferred executive efficiency to due process. The
Court makes no allowances for crisis-time needs. This opinion
contrasts with the Court’s rather deferential attitude in the cases
surveyed above regarding the interpretation of substantive due
process. One can see that where questions of procedural due process
are concerned, the Court made no concessions, despite the crisis-time
atmosphere.
The Bregman decision is a far-reaching interpretation of the
obligation to prevent conflicts of interests. According to it,
representatives of any body, not only of private interests, would not
be able to take part in any quasi-judicial procedures. This decision
has been very influential on Israeli administrative law in general and
planning law in particular. After the crisis was over, when the
Knesset legislated a large-scale amendment to the P&B Law
(Amendment 43), it incorporated the Bregman principles into the
regular legislation.72
In summary, the Interim Law reduced public-participation
opportunities in six ways, each causing a dent in the due-process
rights established under the regular law. One might ask: Did the
Interim Law perhaps increase participation rights in some ways, as
partial “compensation”? Yes, but in a rather insignificant way. Under
the regular law, the notice about deposit of a plan must be published
72. See Part VI.
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in two national dailies, at least one of which must be of high
circulation; whereas under the Interim Law, the number of national
dailies is increased to three, and the number of high-circulation ones
to two. Yet, this is hardly compensation for the substantial reduction
in participation rights, which under Israeli’s regular planning law too,
were then, and still are, rather skimpy in internationally comparative
terms.73 Israeli planning authorities are not obliged to serve personal
notices even when they know that certain parties will definitely be
injured by the proposed plan. In the absence of a personal notice, it
would be almost as unlikely that a potentially injured party would
happen to read a stamp-size notice published in three national
newspapers as in two.74 The reduction in time to submit an objection
reduced the likelihood that information would reach an injured party
much more significantly than the additional newspaper publication
added to that likelihood.
5. Streamlining by Limiting Planning-Staff Scrutiny
The Interim Law in Clause 4 severely reduced the time allocated
for scrutiny by the planning support staff and for deliberations by the
committees. In the Interim Law as originally approved, no time was
specifically allocated for staff assessment, except for ten days
according to internal administrative guidelines.75 The law was later
amended so as to allow the district and local planners, together, no
more than thirty days to check the proposed plan. Where an industrial
plan was concerned, a special Advisory Team had ten days in which
to decide whether it was necessary that an environmental impact
statement be prepared. Once these time periods were exceeded, the
developer was authorized to submit the plan directly to the HCC for
its decision and the HCC would not be allowed to withhold its
decision for further staff input.
While the tight time schedule may not seem outrageous to an
American planner who deals with routine suburban housing and
73. See supra note 23.
74. Notices pertaining to all plans throughout the country are published in the national
newspapers without any categorization by location, type of procedure etc.
75. Internal explanatory guidelines written by Yehezkel Levi, Chief Attorney for the
Ministry of Interior, 1990.
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shopping, one should recall that the Israeli context is generally much
more complex. On almost every piece of land there are many
contending interests and considerations to be taken into account.
Furthermore, the interim law applied to large-scale projects only.
Thus, in many cases, excessive reduction of time for staff assessment
was bound to hamper adequate planning decisions.
In an opinion survey of planners and decision makers involved
with the HCCs that Prengler-Rosmarin and I conducted in 1992-
1993, many stated that in their opinion, the Interim Law did lead to a
higher proportion of inadequate planning decisions than the regular
law.76 The major complaints were about inadequate environmental
considerations (such as approval of large housing projects in
sensitive-aquifer areas even though sewerage facilities were not yet
adequate) and about inadequate allocation of land for public facilities.
6. Eroding the Institutional Hierarchy and Abolishing the
Consistency Requirements
In the name of streamlining the approval process of plans for
housing and related projects, the designers of the Interim Law set out
in Clause 4 to weaken the power of district and national-level plans
that may have set limits for such development. They even sought to
weaken the authority of the National Planning and Building Board.
The Interim Law abolished the logic of the entire hierarchy of
national, district, and local planning institutions so inherent to the
Israeli land use planning system. The law challenged the logic of
consistency among the plans in that hierarchy. The HCCs were
authorized to approve development that did not accord with a district
plan, without requiring the approval of the National Planning Board,
which, under the regular law, is authorized to approve district plans
or amendments to them.
When the law was first enacted, the HCCs were even authorized
to approve plans that contradicted valid national plans, and the
National Board was allowed only fifteen days in which to veto such
76. Rachelle Alterman & Erella Prengler-Rosmarin, The Planning and Building
Procedures Law [‘Valal Law’]— The Good, the Bad, and the Controversial (1997) (working
paper, The Klutznick Center for Urban and Regional Studies, Technion (Hebrew)).
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decisions. If no veto were received in time, the plan would come into
force. The law thus placed the National Board in a straightjacket that
made it almost impossible for it to undertake responsible assessments
of the hundreds of plans that raced through the HCCs. In the
atmosphere of crisis and national alignment that prevailed, it is not
surprising that the Board rarely applied its veto, and in the few cases
it thought it essential to do so, not always was it able to act in time.
In 1992, after a few highly controversial plans were approved by
default even though they contradicted important national interests,
the law was amended. According to the amended law, before a
proposed local plan that contradicted a valid national outline plan
would come into force, it would have to be approved by the National
Board. Note that the requirement for “approval” by the Board was a
reduced requirement than under the regular law, whereby national
plans, once approved, cannot be contradicted even by the National
Board itself, unless amended according to the procedures specified in
the law and approved by the Cabinet. The amended interim law
allowed the Board thirty days to provide its approval but left unclear
what would happen if that time were exceeded. Was the intention of
the legislators that the plan would then come into force automatically
as before the amendment? This question has no direct answer in court
decisions.77
The 1991 amendment to the Interim Law specified one interesting
exception to the authority of the National Board to approve
deviations from national outline plans: a “national plan for immigrant
absorption” must be fully adhered to and could not be overridden
even with the approval of the National Board. Interestingly, when the
amendment to the Interim Law was enacted, that plan had not yet
been approved, so the law was in fact referring to a future plan. The
story of how this exceptional national-plan initiative came up is told
elsewhere.78
The language of the legislation left unclear many questions about
77. In the text accompanying note 68, I discuss a High Court decision where the court
interpreted a similar language regarding the time limit for the decision of the HCC (not the
National Board) as not indicating approval by default. See H.C. 4816/1991, Binyaney Gil Ltd
vs. The Housing Construction Commission, Tel Aviv District, 41(1) P.D. 44.
78. See Alterman, supra note 14.
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the relationship among plans in the hierarchy, especially the
relationship between plans approved by the HCCs and national
statutory plans. This issue came up indirectly before the High Court
of Justice in the Maccabim case discussed above79 where the
petitioners argued, among other things, that the HCCs were not
authorized to approve a plan for a new town because such plans
would normally come under the subject-matter handled by the
National Board. Judge Dorner, in her minority opinion, analyzes the
Interim Law’s legislative history and rationale and comes to the
conclusion that the petitioners were right in their argument on this
issue. However, her opinion remained in the minority and no other
court case has shed much light on this issue.
7. Bypassing the Agricultural Land Preservation Mechanism
Seeking to remove barriers to development that were seen as
unreasonable, the Interim Law in Clause 4 also severely eroded the
powers of the national Commission for the Preservation of
Agricultural Land (CPAL). This was the only significant change in
the CPAL’s powers since the Planning and Building Law (P&B Law)
was enacted in 1965.80
The Interim Law reduced the powers of the CPAL dramatically.
Under the regular law any proposed development on declared
agricultural land required the active review and approval by the
CPAL. The Interim Law brought the CPAL “down” by making its
representative a regular member of each Housing Construction
Commission. The law also authorized the Housing Construction
Commissions to approve all and any plans that fulfill the Interim
Law’s substantive authority conditions, even plans that release
agricultural land for development. The only privileged status allowed
to the CPAL representative was that she could call in a particular plan
for the CPAL’s direct review within ten days after a plan has been
79. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
80. The only other change made in the legislation regarding agricultural land preservation
was in 1988 through Amendment 26 to the P&B Law. That amendment restricted the CPAL’s
discretion regarding highway routes designated in statutory plans, to move them by only seven
hundred fifty meters in either direction, if deemed necessary for farmland protection and if such
a move would not constitute a substantive change to the plan.
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deposited for public review. However, even under such special
circumstances, the CPAL was allowed only fifteen days to assess the
plan and if its decision were delayed, the plan would be approved by
default. As might be expected, under the atmosphere of urgency and
the dynamics of membership in the HCCs, the representatives of the
CPAL used their call-in powers only in exceptional cases. For most
plans the HCCs, therefore, provided single-stop decisions that
bypassed not only the National Board but even the previously all-
mighty CPAL.
8. Self-Termination of Plans as Growth-Management Timing
Controls
The designers of the Interim Law attempted to fold into it some
sophisticated mechanisms of timing control to avoid delays in
development by the developer. The international literature on
regulative planning or its ambitious American euphemism, “growth
management,” is replete with various ideas about how such timing
control might be achieved. Such control nevertheless remains elusive
in most regulative planning systems, whether American-style
zoning81 or continental-European style statutory plans.82 Nor was it
easily implementable under the regular Israeli Planning and Building
Law, either before the crisis or subsequently.
Beyond the prevalent notion that, once approved, plans or zoning
convey as of right development privileges until they are changed, the
regular Israeli Planning and Building Law has an additional
impediment. Any change of a local outline or detailed plan that
adversely affects the real-estate value of the site to which it applies is
potential ground for a compensation claim under Clause 197 of the
Planning and Building Law.83 While the law regarding compensation
81. As early as 1982, in the first edition of LAND USE LAW, Mandelker justified the need
for “growth management” thus: “Traditional zoning is not effective as a growth management
control. The zoning map indicates areas for future development but does not include timing and
phasing controls.” DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 285 (1982) or 421 (1997).
82. SCHMIDT-EICHSTEADT, LAND USE PLANNING AND BUILDING PERMISSION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (1995).
83. Unless it falls under one of the exemptions specified in Clause 200, but the
explanation of this complex area of law is well beyond the scope of this article.
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is well beyond the scope of this Article, I could summarize and say
that by 1990 court decisions had established a rather landowner-
friendly interpretation of the legislation.84 So, one of the real legal
impediments (beyond the major impediment that was simply lack of
innovative thinking) to the emergence of effective timing-control
tools before the crisis was the fear that some future court decision
might regard self-termination of a plan as compensable.
Thus, the Interim Law supplied a superb opportunity to try out
what seemed to its designers in the Ministry of the Interior be a
growth manager’s dream. Clause 6 specified a three-pronged timing-
control tool: 1) A plan, once approved, is valid for only two years,
unless its implementation has commenced. 2) Each plan is to specify
what is to be considered commencement of implementation and the
chair of the District Commission is to monitor implementation and
report about it within two years. Each plan must also specify the
financial and other consequences of the self-termination of the plan in
the case of non-commencement (for example, refund of any
betterment levy paid or compensation paid out, or return of land
dedicated to public use, to its original use). 3) In case of non-
commencement in time, the Commission can nullify or amend the
plan without being liable for compensation claims.
After about a year of the law’s operation, decision-makers felt that
the need to specify particular implementation-threshold criteria for
each plan was too complex. The Interim Law was amended to define
a pre-set, uniform criterion: “Commencement of construction” was
defined as “construction of the foundations for at least 20% of the
housing units approved under the plan.” In a subsequent amendment,
the sunset timing of the plan was extended to three years.
The story of what happened to these timing controls and moratoria
will be unpleasant to the ears of growth-management zealots. The
main test for the effectiveness of the timing controls should have
come when the law was finally terminated in mid-1995. Almost five
years had passed since the law was enacted; that should have been the
opportunity to implement the moratorium rules that had not been
effectively implemented while the law was in effect. Here was the
84. See Alterman & Haim, supra note 40.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/29
p773+Alterman.doc 01/04/01
2000] Land Use Law in the Face of a Rapid-Growth Challenge 825
moment of truth: Will government and the legislature allow hundreds
of plans for tens of thousands of housing units to sunset and revert to
the original land use (usually agriculture)?
The representatives of the Ministry of Housing, the Lands
Administration, Finance, and the Prime Minister’s Office, made a
strong argument against the moratorium rule. After all, they said,
government policy, intended to avoid further hikes in housing prices,
is to encourage a reserve of approved plans for as many as fifty
thousand housing units at any given time. That goal is far from being
met. What advantage would there be to allow valid plans, which have
already passed the planning-approval process, to sunset? This
argument prevailed. The Knesset amended the Interim Law to say
that that even if implementation of a plan did not commence by the
time the law was terminated in April 1995, the plan will not self-
terminate, but that the District Commission will be authorized to
amend or void it. In that case, the owner of an interest in the land will
not be eligible for compensation.
To the best of my knowledge, although the timing controls may
have been of some benefit in stimulating construction during the life
of the Interim Law, few, if any, plans have actually been allowed to
sunset under it.
V. EVALUATING THE INTERIM LAW IN PRACTICE
In this part I report on the de facto method in which the new
planning bodies (and their legal advisors) applied the law in practice
and on some of the key outputs and impacts. Because the most large-
scale decisions were made during the first year after the Interim
Law’s enactment, and the more important High Court decisions
interpreting the law were given a year or two later, not always can
one observe the imprints of the court’s decisions.
Although the 1965 Planning and Building Law was not abolished
and continued to operate side by side with the 1990 Interim Law, the
latter was to dominate the Israeli land use planning scene for the next
five years. It shaped much of Israel’s built-up environment and
served as a precedent— both positive and negative— for any new
planning legislation to be proposed in the coming years.
One cannot speak of the impact of the Interim Law as monolithic.
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Its application was very much influenced by the degree of urgency in
the atmosphere surrounding it. Its application while the crisis was at
its height in the first year after approval (1990-1991) was quite
different from its application a year or two later, when the rate of
mass-immigration subsided and stabilized. Its application also
differed among local authorities. The particular goals and attitudes of
the various players determined the manner in which the law was
applied in particular locations at particular times.
I do not presume to cover all or most of the aspects whereby one
might assess the application and impacts of the land use decisions
made in order to handle the massive growth pressures. Instead, I have
selected several aspects that are of special significance: the impacts
of the large-scale agricultural-land conversions, the quantitative
outputs of the HCCs under the interim law, and the degree to which
the streamlining objectives of the Interim Law have been reached.
A. The Impact of High-Pressure Decisions: The Example of
Conversion of Agricultural Land
Two eminent political scientists have characterized Israeli
planning during the country’s formative years— the 1950s and
1960s— as “high pressure planning.”85 Public-policy decisions were
made in haste. Knowledge was valued less than action. By 1990
Israel had thoroughly changed; but did the accelerated-growth crisis
create a comeback of the “high pressure planning” syndrome? In this
section I discuss one example: decisions regarding agricultural land
conversions.
Shortly after the Interim Law came into effect, in its August 1990
meeting the Cabinet instructed the Lands Administration and the
CPAL to de-classify nine thousand hectares (22500 acres) of
nationally-owned agricultural land, of which six thousand hectares
were to be in the central area. This was an unprecedented initiative in
land-tight Israel. Since 1968, after the P&B Law came into effect and
the CPAL made its major declaration of agricultural land, most of the
decisions of the CPAL had been incremental. The commission
usually assessed development proposals incrementally, as they came
85. B. AKZIN & Y. DROR, ISRAEL: HIGH-PRESSURE PLANNING (1966). 
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up from the local and district planning commissions in the ongoing
course of approval of plans. It rarely initiated conversion of farmland
on its own. In an empirical study undertaken just prior to the crisis,86
we found that in the years just preceding the crisis, the average
annual total amount of land conversions in the entire country was
approximately nine thousand hectares. Never was there a massive de-
classification resembling the crisis-time order.
One should not forget that this declassification in one shot was not
intended to replace, nor did it replace, the incremental
declassification requests that still came up through the regular
planning bodies both on private land and on nationally-owned land.
In addition, the enactment of the Interim Law probably accelerated
the pace of incremental conversions of agricultural land because the
HCCs were empowered to approve plans without direct CPAL
approval.
In view of the cabinet’s decision,87 and with little time for in-
depth analysis, the tiny planning staff of the CPAL was obliged to
scan the maps for classified agricultural land that could be
declassified and released for development. They undoubtedly did
their best to minimize negative impacts on open space, but time
constraints made in-depth policy assessment impossible.88
The decision to de-classify agricultural land ahead of concrete
development proposals, especially in the country’s core and high-
density areas, has irreversibly changed the course of development of
Israel. The decision unleashed economic energies that promoted
further sprawl. Some think this has been for the better, since Israel’s
economy subsequently grew significantly; but others feel that this
was not wise growth management. The large-scale declassification of
86. RACHELLE ALTERMAN & MIRIAM ROSENSTEIN, ISRAEL’S AGRICULTURAL LAND
PROTECTION POLICY: THE LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION (1992).
87. This situation raises an intersting legal issue: What is the legal status of the Cabinet’s
“instructions” given to statutory bodies such as the CPAL and the Lands Administration?
88. The Comptroller General in her 1992 report (pp. 286-288) criticizes the Commission
for the Preservation of Agricultural Land for not providing the Lands Administration with
enough planning guidelines for determining priorities in the conversion of agricultural land. The
Comptroller would have liked to see criteria to minimize the impact on viable agriculture,
minimize costs to government (compensation to farmers), maximize access to infrastructure,
and be attuned to socio-economic changes in certain types of rural cooperative villages that
have gradually been phasing out as viable agriculture-based communities.
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open-space reserves in the country’s core is partially responsible for
unleashing suburban and ex-urban development pressures that had
been contained before the crisis. The 1990s saw the proliferation of
new ex-urban neighborhoods, industrial sites, and shopping centers.
The country’s open-space reserves were depleted at an accelerated
pace.
B. The Interim Law’s Production Rates
The race between Interior and Housing over the legislation
continued within the new Housing Commissions. The Ministry of
Housing’s planners doubted that the new commissions would be set
up fast enough and that they would speedily approve a large number
of plans. Yet, the planning staff and members of the HCCs were
eager to show that the new commissions could function effectively.
In a matter of days during July 1990, the head of the National
Planning Administration— the professional-administrative support for
the statutory planning system at Interior— did what they had been
unable to do for decades. They managed to pump vibrant life-blood
into the ailing regulative planning system. Before the crisis, planning
departments at all levels were grossly understaffed and under-
budgeted (by any international comparative indicators). The all-
powerful Ministry of Finance consistently objected to any significant
increases. Now Interior’s senior planners, succeeded in getting a
several-fold increase in professional slots for the planning
commissions— not only the six new ones, but also the six existing
district commissions and the national Planning Administration.
Planners working for Housing submitted scores of plans to the
new commissions and were surprised by their speed. Within a little
over one year, plans for three hundred fifty thousand housing units in
both the public and private sectors had been processed— an
astounding number. To get a sense of scale of the numbers, note that
the total housing stock in Israel on the eve of the crisis was
approximately 1.25 million. Had all the units approved by the Interim
Law been built (that is never the case), they would have added
twenty-seven percent to the country’s total housing stock
accumulated over many decades (including pre-state times). The
Ministry of the Interior won this race!
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The large-scale housing blitz carried great impacts, but it was the
local initiatives that could turn them in a negative or positive
direction. Centralization was expressed not only in the procedural
changes but concretely in the implementation arena. Since there was
no tradition of municipal housing in Israel, the Ministry of Housing
called the shots for the entire public-program housing construction. If
not resisted by an astute local authority, the Ministry would specify
the number of housing starts for each municipality, prepare site plans,
and issue RFPs for architects and builders.
Although local authorities maintained their exclusive legal powers
to issue building permits, both the Planning and Building Law and
the Interim law obliged them to issue such permits if the proposed
development fully accorded with the approved plan. The city
engineer, however, still had the power to negotiate construction and
design details as well as require the fulfillment of various conditions
by the developers. The two local case studies I conducted89 showed
that at this juncture significant differences emerged among local
planners, differences that reflected the strategy, conviction, and
ingenuity of both planners and elected politicians. These differences
significantly influenced the quality of the housing outputs.
C. Have the Streamlining Objectives of the Interim Law Been
Reached?
The rationale for the Interim Law was to set up a regulative
planning system that would be able to assess and approve or reject
plan proposals in a much shorter time than the regular system. Has
this goal been achieved?
There is an empirical answer to this question, based on research
conducted by Michelle Sofer and myself.90 The research focused on
the time element in planning, comparing the specifications in the law
to results in practice. One section of the research analyzed the lengths
of time that passed between deposit and approval of plans under the
89. See ALTERMAN, supra note 14.
90. RACHELLE ALTERMAN & MICHELLE SOFER, STREAMLINING PROCEDURES? THE
DEGREE OF SUCCESS OF RECENT LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO SHORTEN THE TIME FOR
APPROVAL OF STATUTORY PLANS (1994) (Hebrew). 
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regular planning system as compared with the Interim-Law planning
system. The years covered in this study were 1991 and 1992.
Table 1: Comparison of the length of time, in months, from plan
deposit to final approval under the regular Planning and Building
Law and the crisis-time Interim Law.
Regular or
Interim Law
May 1991 Nov.-Dec.
1991
May 1992 Nov.-Dec.
1992
Under the regular
P&B Law
Average: 16.4 m
Median: 11.0 m
Average: 18.4
Median: 10.0
Average: 17.0
Median: 9.0
Average: 16.2
Median: 9.0
Under the Interim
Law
Average: 4.5
Median: 5.0
Average: 5.9
Median: 6.0
Average: 9.0
Median: 8.0
Average: 8.6
Median: 7.5
Table 1 presents the mean and median lengths of time in a
representative sample of plans. In order to avoid season-bound
differences, we chose two time periods— May and November-
December. The sources of information about the dates were the
Israeli Official Gazette publications of the statutorily required notices
regarding plan deposit and plan approval.
Four observations emerge from the table. First, the Interim Law
indeed sped up the plan-approval process considerably, compared
with the regular law. The differences in approval time are most
striking when one compares averages: sixteen to eighteen months
under the regular law versus five to nine months under the interim
law. Second, the differences are much smaller when one compares
medians rather than averages— nine to eleven months under the
regular law, compared with five to eight months under the Interim
Law. This is due to the fact that, during non-crisis times, some plans
tend to drag on, not necessarily due to bureaucratic recalcitrance, but
because the developer has lost interest or will not abide by the
conditions set for approval. Third, the approval time under the
Interim Law rose significantly between the first and second years of
the crisis, while under the regular law it remained almost steady. And
fourth, by the end of 1992, the differences in approval time between
the two systems declined significantly. If one uses the median as an
indicator, the time differences had become very small: nine months
and seven and one half months respectively.
The implications of these findings are clear: At the height of the
crisis, there was a general consensus, shared by decision makers and
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planners alike, about the urgency of accommodating growth and
accelerating housing and ancillary construction. Under that
atmosphere speed was paramount. The planning staff of the HCCs
were willing to cut corners in professional input and planning
oversight. As the atmosphere of urgency waned, however, planning
scrutiny was intensified. The planning staff and the decision-makers
in the HCCs gradually resumed the level of assessment and
regulation that they had applied prior to the crisis. This may explain
the most striking finding from that research: within only eighteen
months, by the end of 1992, the time periods for approval under the
two processes had almost merged. From the vantage point of 2000, I
may add my own impressions, unsubstantiated by empirical research:
The differences in lengths of time between the two laws totally
disappeared in later years, perhaps even reversing by the end of the
decade.
One may conclude from this case study, that legislative mandates
of speed, even if they include rules of automatic approval as
instituted by the Interim Law, are not as effective as the engulfing
decision atmosphere.
D. Growing criticism of the Interim Law
While the crisis was still going strong, the only in-government
written criticism of the new law came from planners in the Ministry
of the Environment. Toward the end of 1991 they were the first
government officials to openly argue that the special housing
commissions were no longer needed because by then an ample stock
of plans for housing units had been approved. They were also the first
government officials to argue what was later to become axiomatic not
only among planners but also among elected politicians, journalists,
and other groups. They argued that in their haste to approve public
and private plans, the commissions were unduly compromising good
planning and environmental quality.91 Among the hundreds of
thousands of housing units for which plans had been approved,
several thousand lacked adequate sewerage capacity.92 The report by
91. Alterman, supra note 14.
92. Valerie Brayha, Plans Approved by the Special Housing-Construction Commissions
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the Environment planners was sharply criticized by the Director
General of Housing and less vociferously by senior planners from the
Interior who were not yet ready to make their growing internal self-
criticism public.93
As the crisis waned and the Interim Planning Law approached its
expiration date of June 1992, however, senior planners in the
Ministry of the Interior, who had earlier advocated the law and
invested their personal prestige to “sell” it, began to express doubts
about its continued use. They joined their colleagues from the
Environment in questioning the need to extend the law. However, the
ministers followed the cabinet’s decision and supported the law’s
extension. Ironically, planners and other officials from Housing, who
in May-June 1990 had opposed the Interim Law, preferring
emergency legislation, now strongly supported its extension. Under a
compromise the Knesset extended the law until December 1992. In
subsequent months planners in the Interior, Environment, the
National Parks and Nature Reserves Authorities, as well as some
planners and elected officials in local governments openly criticized
the continuation of the crisis-time legislation. They argued that there
was already an excess of approved housing units and that the
shortcuts in procedures were causing more harm than good. But
planners from Housing, the Lands Administration, and Finance
continued to support the law, as did their superiors.
The growing disagreement between some planners and their
superiors came to a head as the December 1992 deadline for
extending the Interim Law approached. The National Planning Board,
with which the government must consult before proposing any
planning legislation to the Knesset, was asked to recommend the
extension of the Interim Law for a second time until June 1993. The
Board deadlocked in October 1992, and in December it voted against
extending the law.94 In a legally interesting twist, some of those
voting against extension were senior planners in government bureaus
(1992) (unpublished report of the Ministry of Environmental quality, State of Israel).
93. An internal report by one of Interior’s planners prepared in late 1991 and early 1992,
which contained some similar criticisms to those in Environment’s report, was not made public.
94. Protocol of meeting no. 302 of the National Planning and Building Board, Oct. 5,
1992. Information on the December meeting from the media and notes taken by Relli Prengler-
Rosmarine, a graduate student at the time.
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to whom their ministers had delegated their seats on the Board and
where the ministers wished the law extended. The Cabinet did not
accept the Board’s recommendation. A bill to extend the law for
another ten months was put before the Knesset and approved.
Twice more the Knesset was asked by government to extend the
law. The head of the Knesset Committee for Internal and
Environmental Affairs, M.K. Eliahu Matza, expressed the
Committee’s dismay and noted that no more extensions would be
allowed. In total the Interim Law was extended four times, for one-
year periods or less each time. The Knesset indicated a growing
recognition that in post-crisis times, the costs of the Interim Law
outweighed its benefits. The Interim Law finally expired in mid-
1995, while the extensive amendment (number 43) to the regular
P&B Law was still in preparation. The government’s request to
extend it for just a few months more, until the amendment to the
regular law would be approved, was refused by Matza and his
committee.
VI. THE IMPACTS OF THE CRISIS ON SUBSEQUENT PLANNING
LEGISLATION
When the Interim Law finally expired in mid-1995, a few months
before Amendment 43 to the 1965 Planning and Building Law
received Knesset approval (see below), the representatives of
Housing, Finance, and the Lands Administration argued that a “void”
would occur, but it never did. After all, the regular law continued to
be valid throughout the crisis and beyond. Furthermore, a transitional
clause in Amendment 43 stated that any plans already submitted to
the Housing Commissions would continue to be handled by them. In
the year 2000 there were still a few plans, hearings, and court appeals
being carried out under the Interim Law. Should one conclude that
“crisis-time laws die hard”?
While the original Interim Law did sunset, its role as a precedent,
both positive and negative, continues. Throughout the 1990s
whenever the cabinet, a particular minister, or some interest group
identified a planning need that it deemed to be urgent, it proposed
that a special law be enacted, along the lines of the Interim Law.
“Accelerated tracks” or “planning bypasses” seem to be popular
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among decision-makers for whatever type of development is favored
by them. The Cabinet has repeatedly decided to ask that such a bill be
prepared so as to accelerate housing supply. In addition, an Interim
Law-like format has been suggested for airports, industrial sites in
peripheral areas, and for tourist facilities for the millions of pilgrims
who were expected to arrive for the year 2000 celebrations and the
Pope’s visit.95 Fortunately, none of these hasty initiatives, intended as
instant remedies for inadequate planning, have gone forth.
The crisis has shown that it was possible to legislate and install
new legal-institutional structures— the Interim Law— with virtually
no transition time or major legislative costs. Hence, after the crisis
government planners were able to convince the previously skeptical
decision-makers that a new planning law was necessary for post-
crisis times. The new law, they argued, could benefit from the lessons
learned in the large-scale laboratory experiment with the Interim
Law.
The National Planning Board unanimously recommended to the
Cabinet that a new law be prepared, and the Cabinet adopted this
recommendation in December 1992, as part of the compromise
package that extended the Interim Law for another year. The Minister
of the Interior was given ten months to come up with a new law.
A special team was set up in 1992 to draft the new law, headed by
the chief attorney of Interior (at the time), Yehezkiel Levi, along with
three representatives of the Association of Engineers and Architects.
The Levi team worked intermittently, with almost no public or even
broader professional exposure.96 The team’s proposal called for a
95. GLOBES daily newspaper (Hebrew), April 5 1999.
96. Here is an example of a spin-off from the crisis that does not pertain directly to this
article’s story but might interest readers who are planners or planning educators. The existing
Planning and Building Law reserved all professional posts on statutory committees to persons
recommended by the Engineers and Architects’ Association. Until that time the Engineers and
Architects’ Association had not accepted into its ranks planners who did not have an
architecture degree (even though the architects’ union within the Association unilaterally
designated itself the “Architects and Planners’ Union”). Though the draft legislation was
written in 1993, twenty-three years after planning education had been introduced to Israel as a
separate profession, its authors wanted to use this opportunity to preserve the anachronism of
not recognizing the planning profession. When the bill was put before the Knesset committee, I
became involved as a pro bono advisor to the Knesset. We managed to convince the Minister of
Interior and finally the Knesset to open up the eligibility for appointment to “persons trained in
the area of urban and regional planning.” Thus, indirectly the post-crisis phase also became a
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reversal of the centralization trends applied in the Interim Law. They
proposed a somewhat more decentralized system than the regular
P&B Law, as well as a more flexible local outline plan. The team
sought to make two long-overdue changes in Israel’s planning law:
(1) In cases where there is an approved comprehensive outline
plan, detailed plans could be approved directly by the
municipal council, without District Commission— i.e., central
government— approval.
(2) Outline plans would be transformed from their rather
detailed, blueprint style, to a more flexible style that would not
be regarded as directly granting development rights.
These changes were long overdue.97 However, most Israeli
decision-makers, and many planners, had never recognized the
intrinsic value of such proposals as a means for improving the quality
of governance or of planning. The team knew full well that
government politicians and the legislators still had an overriding
interest in speeding up the plan-approval process and were concerned
about what would happen the morning after the Interim Law would
sunset. They, therefore, tried to sell its draft bill by emphasizing its
effectiveness in streamlining development control.
The team was right, but too late; the window of opportunity for a
new planning law created in the wake of the crisis had begun to close,
and the interest of the elected officials and senior bureaucrats was
waning. Many other issues in Israel’s dense political environment
occupied the public agenda. The Levi Team’s argument in favor of a
new planning law was insufficient to push the major conceptual
changes through. The draft bill was watered down considerably
before it was submitted to the Knesset as a government bill. The
legislative process watered it down even more, and instead of a new
law it was cast as an amendment to the 1965 Planning and Building
major turning point in the institutionalization of the planning profession in Israel.
97. I had advocated such changes a decade before the crisis. Rachelle Alterman, The
Planning and Building Law and Local Plans: Rigid Regulations or a Flexible Framework, 11
MISHPATIM 179 (1981). The Israeli Supreme Court adopted and applied my analysis of the law
and ruled that flexible plans were a desirable planning format and were possible even under
existing law.
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Law.
The Knesset legislative process took more than a year. The bill
was finally enacted into law in mid 1995 and became Amendment 43
to the P&B Law. The closed-door approach of the Levy Committee
was not repeated during the official legislative process. Ironically, the
very crisis where government tried to increase centralization and
reduce participation can be directly credited with the relatively open,
participatory approach adopted by the Knesset committee during the
post-crisis legislative process. This was probably due to the
heightened public-professional interest in planning legislation that the
controversy about the enactment of the Interim Law had generated in
1990. The legislative process for Amendment 43 also generated much
public interest, and representatives of major interest groups were
invited to the weekly deliberations of the Knesset Committee for the
Interior and Environmental Affairs.98
The amendment, though the most extensive ever to be made to the
1965 Planning and Building Law, turned out to be only one more
attempt, albeit more thorough and extensive, to streamline the plan-
approval and building permitting process by changing various
procedural elements. Of the two major principles in the draft bill,
only a watered-down degree of decentralization remained. For the
first time, local planning commissions would have the authority to
approve amendment plans for certain minor types of variations in the
previous zoning and development regulations without district-
commission approval.99 Even this modest change should be entirely
credited to the crisis; otherwise, it would probably not have arrived
on the Knesset table for another decade. As modest as Amendment
43 was in the decentralization it granted, this is still the greatest step
towards decentralization taken so far in Israeli planning law. Astute
local authorities and developers have learned how to make the most
of these new powers.
Although Amendment 43 was intended to substitute to some
extent for the Interim Law, it did not reduce public-participation
98. I served as pro bono advisor and participated in most of the meetings during the
course of a year.
99. Even this small degree of automony would be subject to the oversight of the Minister
of the Interior, as before the amendment.
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rights to achieve streamlining. Interestingly, once the crisis was over,
the legislative process not only reinstituted all the rights for
information and for voicing objections that existed in the regular law,
it actually expanded them considerably to reflect the more open
government and the developments in administrative due-process law
that had occurred since 1965. Israel in the mid-1990s was a country
no longer in the midst of a crisis of accelerated growth but was still
growing more than most other advanced-economy countries. The
new legislation struck a reasonable compromise between the need to
manage accelerated growth and the norms of enhanced public
participation and due process.
Amendment 43 introduced two major changes that enhanced
public access to land use planning procedures. First, in order to
handle objections submitted to the new types of plans under local-
commission jurisdiction, the Amendment established a special quasi-
judicial body in each district— an Appeals Commission chaired by a
lawyer with experience in planning law. After four years of operation
of these commissions, my assessment is they are more accessible to
the public and less deferential to government decisions than the
appeals process under the P&B Law before the amendment. There,
the regular planning bodies, not a special quasi-judicial body, heard
appeals.
The Amendment also established special planning-administration
courts that would substitute for the High Court of Justice. The
objective was to reduce the excessive load on the High Court— as
Israel’s Supreme Court is called when it handles petitions against
government or quasi-government bodies. Over the decades planning-
law cases had proliferated and by the mid-1990s had come to
constitute a major category. Under the Amendment the regular
district court in each of Israel’s six districts would have an additional
composition as Courts for Administrative Matters. These would be
authorized to handle petitions against planning bodies. Only petitions
that directly address the National Planning and Building Board or
national outline plans would remain under the jurisdiction of the High
Court. After four years since this change, one can conclude that
although the goal of this change was motivated by judicial efficiency,
its spinoffs have been greater access to petitioners and a large number
of decisions delivered by these courts. I would hypothesize that a
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silent competition is developing among the six courts over which
court would deliver the most citizen-friendly decisions.
Although the impact of the crisis on post-crisis planning
legislation was somewhat less than I had expected, there is no doubt
that as a result of the crisis, the very status of land use planning and
planning law has been elevated in the politicians’ eyes. In October
1999 the Cabinet accepted Prime Minister Barak’s proposal that his
Office would take over the entire national and district-level planning
functions from Interior (recall Figure 1).
Unlike most of the previous legislative and institutional changes
in the planning system, this time the major rationale for the proposed
transfer was not only to speed up planning decisions. It was mainly,
to elevate land use planning to the status of a major tool of national
policymaking and implementation. The expectation was that location
of statutory planning in the Prime Minister’s Office would enable
better interministerial and intergovernmental coordination. This
proposal is thus a recognition of the growing importance of land use
planning— a recognition brought about to a large extent by the
accelerated-growth challenge.
Although it is likely some form of crisis-like streamlining
legislation would be proposed as part of this institutional realignment,
I predict that this time it will go beyond a speed-all legislation and
will deal with more fundamental changes in public participation and
the format and contents of plans. Rather, if streamlining legislation is
once more proposed, it will likely be targeted only to projects deemed
to be of national importance. Internationally comparative research
undertaken by this author has shown that such initiatives are
prevalent among other advanced-economy democratic countries and
are not crisis-dependent.100
CONCLUSION
The challenge of handling accelerated growth— mass immigration
to Israel from the former USSR— demonstrated that a regular land
use law system, even one with extensive growth-management tools,
was unable to handle accelerated growth efficiently. Israel’s regular
100. Alterman, supra note 23.
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land use law would have caused unacceptable delays with major
negative repercussions that decision makers and society at large
could not tolerate. Massive homelessness of both immigrants and
non-immigrants priced out of their housing was a risk that no
responsible decision maker in Israel, neither local nor national, was
willing to take. The Minister of Construction and Housing even tried
to issue emergency regulations in order to provide a means of
regulating large-scale construction of housing.
On the eve of the crisis, Israel’s planning legislation had become a
symbol of fossilized bureaucracy and a target for attack from many
quarters. Yet there was not much chance that the bureaucrats and
legislators, always preoccupied with Israel’s major political agendas
of war and peace and of ethnic and religious issues, would be willing
to devote the extensive legislative time necessary to prepare a new
law. Shortly before the crisis, in 1988, the Knesset enacted an
extensive, but largely technical amendment (amendment 26),
intended for streamlining the plan-approval process. Even this limited
amendment had taken years to prepare and approve.
The crisis demonstrated the importance of speedy planning
procedures in order to manage accelerated growth. The Interim Law
was enacted in record speed. Under the new procedures, the planning
bodies were able to handle five to ten fold the number of planning
initiatives. The crisis showed that it was indeed possible to enact
legislation that would shorten plan-approval procedures drastically—
to about one third of what they were. The Interim Law probably did
help significantly to avoid a massive housing shortage.
At the same time, the experience with the Interim Law also
demonstrated the price paid for an over-emphasis on speed: extensive
negative impacts of planning decisions done in haste and a reduction
in citizen participation rights. However, both these negative impacts
leveled down with the passage of time. As the crisis waned,
professional scrutiny reasserted itself (and the decisions took longer
than before). At the same time, the High Court, in a series of cases,
interpreted the interim law so as to make no concessions in
procedural due process. In effect, court decisions minimized the
reduction in public-participation rights intended by the legislators. I
would guess that, had the Interim Law continued to be in effect after
1995, court decisions would have gradually re-introduced
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requirements of professional scrutiny and public input that would
have almost lead to a convergence in lengths of time for planning
decisions under the crisis-time and regular laws.
The crisis-time law also highlighted the impacts, both positive and
negative, of the attempt to centralize planning decisions. On the
positive side, the problem of social exclusion by local governments,
which is so prevalent in other countries, was largely avoided by
means of centralization. Some towns received an increment of fifty
percent and more to their population as a result of massive immigrant
absorption, yet phenomena of exclusion within these towns were rare.
On the other hand, the crisis showed that centralization of decisions
did not necessarily equalize treatment among towns. Some local
governments were able to remain more or less exclusionary yet to
wield the Interim Law and the growth momentum so as to serve the
interests of the town’s non-immigrant population. The crisis
experience highlighted the fact that in an entrenched democracy there
are limits to centralization. Astute local governments will likely be
able to exert their influence even if central government ostensibly
centralizes some of their formal powers. By contrast, local
governments with a less effective and vociferous leadership (or with
more commitment to national goals), would end up bearing more of
the brunt than their fair share. Centralization does not necessarily
serve as an equalizing mechanism.
The experience with the crisis-time legislation convinced the
Cabinet that once the crisis was over, they must initiate a fresh new
planning law. In this task, they would benefit from the lessons
learned in the large-scale crisis-time experiment with the special
legislation passed in order to manage the rapid-growth crisis.
However, by the year 2000 no new law has as yet been enacted.
Several bodies in Israel, both within government and outside, have
taken the initiative to set up teams to work on draft bills. I have little
doubt that the lessons learned from the crisis— the need to balance
speed with the preservation of due process— will be important input
to the work of these and other teams, once the legislative effort
becomes serious.
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